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Automakers such as Toyota and GM were recently caught by the U.S. regulator for deliberately hiding
product defects in an attempt to avoid massive recalls. Interestingly, regulators in the U.S. and U.K. employ
different policies in informing consumers about potential defects: The U.S. regulator publicly announces all
on-going investigations of potential defects to provide consumers with early information, whereas the U.K.
regulator does not. To understand how these different announcement policies may affect cover-up decisions
of automakers, we model the strategic interaction between a manufacturer and a regulator. We find that,
under both countries’ policies, the manufacturer has an incentive to cover up a potential defect when there
is a high chance that the defect indeed exists and it may inflict only moderate harm. However, if there is
only a moderate chance that the defect exists, only under the U.S. policy does the manufacturer have an
incentive to cover up a potential defect with significant harm. We show that the U.S policy generates higher
social welfare only for very serious issues for which both the expected harm and recall cost are very high and
the defect is likely to exist. We make four policy recommendations that could help mitigate manufacturers’
cover-ups, including a hybrid policy in which the regulator conducts a confidential investigation of a potential
defect only when it may inflict significant harm.
Key words : Product recalls, automotive industry, socially responsible operations, public policy
1. Introduction
“A new car built by my company leaves somewhere traveling at 60 mph. The rear differential locks up.
The car crashes and burns with everyone trapped inside. Now, should we initiate a recall? Take the
number of vehicles in the field, A, multiply by the probable rate of failure, B, multiply by the average
out-of-court settlement, C. A times B times C equals X. If X is less than the cost of a recall, we don’t
do one.” From the movie Fight Club.
In 2009 and 2010, Toyota recalled more than eight million vehicles due to a sudden unintended
acceleration defect that resulted in 89 deaths and 57 injuries (McCurry 2010, CBS News 2010).
Although this was a serious defect, Toyota was criticized mainly for attempting to cover up the
defect. Specifically, the United States (U.S.) government accused Toyota of deliberately hiding the
evidence of defects from the regulatory agency, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
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(NHTSA), and delaying the recall (Mitchell and Linebaugh 2010). The company denied the accu-
sation, and blamed drivers by stating that “most of the 48 deaths ... involved drivers who were
elderly, had medical issues, were distracted or navigating slippery roads” (Searcey 2010). However,
in 2014, four years of criminal probe by the Department of Justice revealed that Toyota knew of
the problem in 2007, but decided not to report it to NHTSA. As a result, Toyota agreed to pay
$1.2 billion to settle the criminal charge (Levinson et al. 2014).
Toyota is not alone in covering up safety issues. In 2014, General Motors (GM) recalled 2.6
million vehicles because of a faulty ignition switch that could shut off engines while driving and
prevent airbags from deploying. By August 2015, this defect was linked to 124 deaths and 275
injuries, and GM set aside $625 million to settle damages (The Wall Street Journal 2015). Similar
to the Toyota case, the U.S. government found that GM was aware of this defect as early as 2004,
but GM decided to neither report this problem to NHTSA nor recall the affected vehicles (Bennett
2014). An alarming fact is that NHTSA considered opening a formal investigation into this defect
twice in 2007 and 2010 following multiple consumer reports, but they decided not to pursue it
because they concluded that there was no discernible trend and that the investigation would have
taken too long and cost too much (White et al. 2014). In the end, GM was criminally charged by
the Department of Justice for deliberately hiding the product defect, and GM agreed to pay $900
million to settle the charge (Spector and Matthews 2015).
These examples demonstrate that automakers can (and do) deliberately hide potential product
safety hazards if they believe they can get away with these issues without being caught by the reg-
ulator. This is possible because manufacturers know their products better and have more resources
than the regulator to investigate safety problems. In addition, manufacturers receive warranty
claims directly from consumers, and a disproportionate number of warranty claims on a partic-
ular component provides a good indication of a product defect. Although the regulator does not
have direct access to those warranty claims, the regulator receives complaints on potential defects
directly from consumers and can voluntarily initiate an investigation. However, the regulator can-
not investigate all alleged problems due to limited resources and costly inspection. Therefore, the
regulator often has to rely on the manufacturers to share detailed information about potential
defects. For example, The Wall Street Journal reports “it’s common for NHTSA to work coopera-
tively with all auto-makers [to identify potential hazards]... Its Office of Defects Investigation has
only 57 employees to deal with some 35,000 complaints a year” (Linebaugh et al. 2010).
Interestingly, regulators in the U.S. and the United Kingdom (U.K.) employ different policies
in informing consumers about alleged product defects. In the U.S., following the Firestone tire
controversy in 2000, Congress passed the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability and
Documentation (TREAD) Act, which mandates manufacturers to submit Early Warning Reporting
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(EWR) data. These data include death, injury, and property damage claims, as well as warranty
claims and consumer complaints to manufacturers. In case NHTSA opens an investigation into an
alleged defect based on EWR data, NHTSA announces on its website the on-going investigation
and detailed information about the alleged defect to consumers.
By contrast, our conversations with the U.K. regulator, Driver & Vehicle Standards Agency
(DVSA), revealed that DVSA also collects detailed information on potential defects from man-
ufacturers, but does not announce this information to consumers unless DVSA opens a formal
investigation and concludes that there is a defect. The rationale behind this approach is that DVSA
believes manufacturers will be more cooperative if DVSA does not announce to consumers every
single alleged safety issue that may turn out to be a false allegation.
Motivated by the contrasting policies in these two countries, we explore two research questions.
First, how does the regulator’s policy on investigation announcement affect manufacturers’ propen-
sity to cover up potential vehicle defects? Second, how does the announcement policy affect the
regulator’s willingness to investigate potential defects and ultimately social welfare? To address
these research questions, we develop a game-theoretic model that captures the strategic interactions
between a regulator (“he”) and a manufacturer (“she”). In the model, the manufacturer receives
a private signal, which may not be completely reliable, about whether her product is defective or
not. If the signal indicates a defect, then the manufacturer decides whether to report a potential
defect to the regulator in order to maximize her expected profit. If the manufacturer reports the
potential defect, then the regulator decides whether to immediately investigate the potential defect
in order to maximize social welfare. If the manufacturer decides to cover up the potential defect,
then the regulator still receives complaints directly from consumers and may initiate a voluntary
investigation at a later time.
Our main findings are summarized in Figure 1. As for our first research question, we find that
both countries’ policies induce manufacturers to cover up a potential defect when the suspected
defect is highly likely to exist but could inflict only relatively moderate harm (upper middle box
in Figure 1(a)). This is because in this case there is a good chance that the manufacturer may get
away with the cover-up under both countries’ policies. This means neither policy is perfect.
However, the major difference is that the U.S. policy is more likely to induce manufacturers to
cover up potential defects with significant harm than the U.K. policy. Specifically, manufacturers
under the U.S. policy have an incentive to cover up a potential defect with significant harm if there
is only a moderate chance that the defect may actually exist (right middle box in Figure 1(a)).
This is because, under the U.S. policy, revealing an alleged defect with significant harm could
substantially reduce consumer demand and thus the manufacturer’s profit, whereas this is not the
case under the U.K. policy. Although a cover-up could potentially increase the manufacturer’s recall
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Figure 1 Cover-up and Investigation Decisions
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and liability costs if caught by the regulator at a later time, this does not concern the manufacturer
much if there is only a moderate chance the defect exists. This finding is in line with the anecdotal
evidence that most recent high-profile cover-ups, such as GM’s cover-up of the ignition switch
defect and Toyota’s sudden acceleration scandal discussed above, have been discovered in the U.S.
but not in the U.K.
As for our second research question, we find that the U.S. regulator is more reluctant to inves-
tigate a potential defect than its U.K. counterpart (see Figure 1(b)). Moreover, the U.S. policy
generates higher social welfare only when the suspected defect is very harmful and highly likely
to exist, and its expected recall cost is high. The intuition for both results is as follows. For the
U.S. regulator, investigation announcements reduce consumer demand, thereby having a negative
impact on both consumer surplus and manufacturer’s profit. Although reduced consumer demand
also has the benefits of reducing potential consumer harm and recall costs, these benefits exceed
the aforementioned downside only when the expected harm, recall cost, and reliability of the signal
are all sufficiently high. The fact that the U.S. policy provides higher social welfare only for serious
issues is rather counterintuitive, because consumers are better informed of alleged defects under
the U.S. policy.
In summary, our analysis shows that the U.S. policy may make the regulator reluctant to investi-
gate alleged defects and discourage manufacturers from reporting potential defects with significant
harm, as compared to the U.K. policy, and may produce higher social welfare only for rather
extreme cases. To better understand our results from a practical perspective, we illustrate all of
our results using realistic parameter values that represent Toyota’s sudden unintended acceleration
recalls.
Based on our findings, we provide four policy recommendations to better prevent cover-up of
potential defects. The first two recommendations apply to the case with full investigation announce-
ments (as in the current U.S. policy) and the last two recommendations apply to the case with
only partial investigation announcements. Our first policy recommendation is that the regulator
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could allocate more resources to the investigation of potential defects with significant harm so as
to shorten the investigation lead time, while announcing all investigations. This would mitigate the
impact of investigation announcements on consumer demand. Second, the regulator could improve
his communication approach so that consumers correctly understand and interpret the probability
the defect exists, while announcing all investigations. For instance, the regulator could use a color-
coding scheme, in which red corresponds to highest probability of defect, orange to intermediate,
and yellow to low. This would help consumers not to overreact to investigation announcements.
Third, the regulator could employ a hybrid policy in which he conducts a confidential investigation
only when the potential defect could inflict significant harm. This hybrid policy is essentially a
combination of what works best in each country’s policy. Finally, the regulator could conduct a
two-phase investigation and only announce the second phase. The U.S. regulator currently conducts
a two-phase investigation, in which the first phase (preliminary analysis) determines whether a
thorough investigation in the second phase (engineering analysis) is warranted. Although the U.S.
regulator announces both phases, announcing only the investigations that proceed to the second
phase would both reduce the number of investigations announced and shorten the announcement
time period, thereby mitigating the overall impact of announcements on consumer demand.
2. Literature Review
Three streams of literature are related to our paper. The first and second streams of literature are
analytical and empirical work on product recalls, respectively. The third stream has a broader scope
and studies the effect of regulatory policies on firm behavior in sustainable operations management.
The first stream of literature is analytical work on product risks and related recall decisions.
A majority of the work examines the effect of different liability rules and regulatory policies on
firms’ incentives to make socially optimal decisions. For example, Hua (2011) studies how a firm’s
incentive to recall depends on different liability rules once it has found safety hazards, and finds
that the firm does not necessarily make a socially optimal number of recalls even if the firm bears
no liability after recall. Spier (2011) studies the effects of different liability rules on a firm’s recall
decisions, when the firm offers monetary compensation to consumers to “buy back” the product.
Sezer and Haksöz (2012) study the timing of recall as an optimal stopping problem, when the
product may have a fault that affects the distribution of the expiration time of the product.
Polinsky and Shavell (2012) examine whether a firm should be mandated to disclose product risks
when the firm can learn about such risks at a cost, and compare the effects of mandatory and
voluntary disclosure of product risks. Although this stream of literature, especially Polinsky and
Shavell (2012), is related to our work, the main difference is that these papers do not consider
firms’ deliberate hiding of product risks and the regulator’s voluntary investigations that could
reveal such cover-ups, nor do they study the effects of the regulator’s investigation announcements.
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The second stream of literature is empirical work on product recalls. This literature examines
the impact of various operational and strategic factors on product recalls. For example, Hora et al.
(2011) empirically find that the time to recall is longer if the recall is “preventive” rather than
“reactive,” the recall is due to a design flaw rather than a manufacturing defect, and the proximity
of the supply chain entity to the end customer is lower. Shah et al. (2017) study drivers of vehicle
recalls at the plant and product levels, and find that manufacturing-related recalls are positively
associated with product variety and plant utilization. Colak and Bray (2019) study the drivers of
vehicle recalls from a more strategic perspective, and find that auto manufacturers initiate recalls
to avoid consumer complaints rather than to avoid government ordered recalls. In addition, studies
find that severe automobile recalls could have a significant short-term impact on demand (Grafton
et al. 1981, Reilly and Hoffer 1983, Rubel et al. 2011, Kalaignanam et al. 2013), although their
impacts on stock prices are unclear (Jarrell and Peltzman 1985, Hoffer et al. 1988, Thirumalai and
Sinha 2011). Similar to these empirical findings, our model assumes that the public announcement
of an on-going investigation of a potential defect has a negative impact on consumer demand.
Furthermore, we model a short-term demand drop after a recall in §C.3 in the online appendix
and find that our main insights are robust. Our work complements the empirical literature by
providing insights into firms’ decisions, prior to product recalls, on whether to reveal the existence
of a potential defect in the first place. For more comprehensive review of the literature on product
safety and recalls, see Marucheck et al. (2011).
Finally, our paper is broadly related to sustainable operations management in that we explore
how regulators can induce socially optimal behavior from firms. In particular, our work is related
to those that study the impact of regulatory policies and information disclosure on firm behavior.
For example, Kim (2015) examines how the interplay between inspections performed by a regulator
and noncompliance disclosure by a production firm affects environmental performance. Cho et al.
(2019) study the effect of information disclosure and penalty schemes in combating child labor.
Kalkanci and Plambeck (2018) examine how mandating disclosure of information about social and
environmental impacts in a supply chain affects a firm’s valuation by investors. Kraft et al. (2018)
experimentally investigate when firms benefit from greater supply chain visibility and transparency.
Kraft et al. (2019) analytically study how a manufacturer should invest in a supplier’s social
responsibility practices when such practices are not perfectly observable. Chen et al. (2019) study
the impact of supply chain transparency on supply chain sustainability and the role of NGOs.
Wang et al. (2019) develop a global game model in which competing firms decide on developing or
adopting a green technology when the probability of a stricter standard on a pollutant increases
with an industry’s voluntary adoption level. Plambeck and Taylor (2016) study the situation in
which buyers, rather than regulators, inspect their own suppliers who can exert effort to hide their
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Figure 2 Sequence of Events
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noncompliance with social and environmental standards. We contribute to this stream of literature
by analyzing how the regulatory policies in the U.S. and in the U.K., which differ in whether or
not to disclose information about ongoing investigation, affect auto manufacturers’ incentives to
cover up potential defects.
3. Model
A manufacturer sells a product with finite life cycle, at selling price p, and, for simplicity, zero
production cost. The true state of the product may be defective (denoted by D) or non-defective
(N). Let h ∈ (0, h̄] represent the expected harm of a defective product to consumers, defined
as the impact of the harm times the probability of the defect causing harm conditional on the
product being defective; e.g., Online Appendix B estimates the expected harm of Toyota’s sudden
unintended acceleration defect to be $125. The prior probability of the product being defective,
Pr(D), and its expected harm, h, are exogenously determined and common knowledge.
A continuum of consumers arrive at a constant rate of one for time t∈ [0,1]; that is, we standard-
ize the length of product life cycle to one. A consumer’s product valuation, v, is a uniform random
variable in [0, v̄] with density f(v) = 1/v̄ and cumulative distribution function F (v). Only consumers
with v≥ p purchase the product and thus the consumer demand rate is d(p) = 1−F (p) = 1− p/v̄.
Figure 2 depicts the sequence of events. At time t= 0, the following events occur sequentially
with negligible time intervals. First, Nature chooses the true state to be D with probability Pr(D)
and N with probability 1−Pr(D); that is, the prior is unbiased. Second, the manufacturer receives
a private signal s ∈ {D̃, Ñ}, where D̃ indicates defective and Ñ non-defective. The signal may
come from the manufacturer’s internal inspections or consumer complaints. The manufacturer uses
her private signal to calculate her posterior probability of defect and optimally chooses whether
to report a potential defect to the regulator (denoted by R) or not (NR) in order to maximize
her expected profit. If the private signal indicates a defect (s = D̃), the regulator mandates the
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manufacturer to report a potential defect.1 Hence, if the manufacturer does not report (NR), we
say that the manufacturer covers up the potential defect. If the private signal is s= Ñ , we assume
that the manufacturer does not report (NR). Third, if the manufacturer reports a potential defect,
the regulator decides whether to investigate immediately (denoted by I) or not (NI) in order to
maximize social welfare. There is a fixed cost C (> 0) of carrying out an investigation and the lead
time of an investigation is a random variable defined on support [0,1] with mean l ∈ (0,1).2 The
only difference between the U.S. and the U.K. policies is that the U.S. regulator announces the
investigation during this l period, whereas the U.K. regulator does not.
If the regulator did not investigate at time t= 0 (either because the manufacturer did not report
a potential defect or the regulator decided not to investigate immediately), then the regulator
may initiate a voluntary investigation at a later time. Whether the regulator initiates such an
investigation depends on the true state of the product being defective or non-defective. If the
true state is D, then consumer complaints may trigger the regulator’s voluntary investigation at
some random time t̂. We assume that an investigation is more likely to happen if the expected
harm h is higher and that the timing of the investigation t̂ is uniformly distributed on the interval
[0,1− l].3 For notational convenience, we define t̂= 1 to represent the event that the regulator does
not carry out a voluntary investigation. Then, t̂ is a random variable that is a mix of a uniform
distribution with density g(t̂ |D) = h/((1− l)h̄) for t̂ ∈ [0,1− l] and a probability mass at t̂ = 1
with Pr(t̂= 1 |D) = 1−h/h̄. If the true state is N , the regulator may still receive some consumer
complaints, but we assume that they are not significant enough to trigger a voluntary investigation;
that is, Pr(t̂= 1 |N) = 1.
A product recall takes place right after any regulator’s investigation (immediate or voluntary)
that concludes that the product is defective. The manufacturer must recall all products sold up to
1 The U.S. mandates manufacturers by law to report all information related to deaths, injuries, warranty claims,
consumer complaints, internal testing results, and other safety related data (Transportation Recall Enhancement,
Accountability, and Documentation Act 2000). The U.K. also mandates manufacturers by law to report any data that
could suggest a potential defect (Driver & Vehicle Standards Agency 2014, The General Product Safety Regulations
2005).
2 We assume that the cost C and lead time l of an investigation are independent of the expected harm h, because
investigating a defect with more significant harm does not necessarily cost more and take longer. For instance, the
investigations of the accelerator malfunction of 2012-2013 Navistar Prostar vehicles and the brake malfunction of
2013-2014 Dodge Dart vehicles of Fiat Chrysler Automobiles took less than 8 months (National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration 2015a,b). Meanwhile, the investigation of spontaneous sunroof breakage of 2011-2013 Kia Sorento,
which could be considered less harmful than an accelerator or brake pedal malfunction, has taken more than 5 years
and is still on-going as of July 2019 (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 2014).
3 We assume that t̂≤ 1− l for tractability, but this assumption also implies that if the regulator receives consumer
complaints, he is likely to initiate an investigation not too late. For instance, Toyota introduces a new generation of
Corolla approximately every 5 years by changing design and components, and NHTSA’s typical investigation duration
is approximately one year. This results in l = 0.2 and t̂ ∈ [0,0.8]. This assumption greatly simplifies our analysis
without altering the main insights.
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that point, incurring the unit recall cost r ∈ (0, p).4 The manufacturer is liable for any harm suffered
by consumers until the recall, and thus has to fully compensate consumers for their harm. This
full compensation may be carried out through consumers’ lawsuits or through the manufacturer’s
voluntary compensation without such lawsuits. In addition, if the manufacturer did not report a
potential defect, the regulator’s voluntary investigation may discover the manufacturer’s cover-
up with probability θ ∈ [0,1]. In this case, the manufacturer pays a penalty to the regulator of
K1h+K2, where K1,K2 ≥ 0. Note that K1 is the variable penalty per unit of expected harm and
K2 is the fixed penalty for the manufacturer’s cover-up. This penalty models, for instance, $1.2
billion that Toyota had to pay to settle the criminal charge for covering up the sudden unintended
acceleration defect. If the true state is D but the regulator never investigates, then consumers may
still sue the manufacturer for compensation. In this case, we define α ∈ [0,1] as (probability of
consumers filing and winning a lawsuit) × (fraction of the harm for which the manufacturer is
liable).
In the U.S., the regulator announces any investigation to consumers, who become aware of the
potential harm from using the product, h. Therefore, while the product is under investigation,
consumers’ valuation temporarily decreases from v to v−h, and thus consumers buy the product
only if their decreased valuation v−h exceeds the price p. As a result, the consumer demand rate
changes from d(p) to d(p,h) = 1−F (p+h) during the investigation period. By contrast, consumers
in the U.K. are not informed of any investigation, and thus the consumer demand rate remains
unaffected.
We model the manufacturer’s private signal following the approach in Chen et al. (2001) and
Iyer et al. (2007). We assume the signal is unbiased; i.e., Pr(D̃) = Pr(D) and Pr(Ñ) = Pr(N).
Let T be the probability that the signal is correct; i.e., T = Pr(D̃|D) ·Pr(D) +Pr(Ñ |N) ·Pr(N).
When the signal is perfectly reliable, we have that Pr(D̃|D) = 1 and Pr(Ñ |N) = 1, and thus
T = Tmax = 1. When the signal is completely unreliable, it does not provide any information beyond
the prior distribution, and thus Pr(D̃|D) = Pr(D) and Pr(Ñ |N) = Pr(N). In this case, T = Tmin =
Pr(D)2 +Pr(N)2. To simplify notation, we define the reliability parameter ρ= (T −Tmin)/(Tmax−
Tmin)∈ [0,1]. Then, the manufacturer’s posterior distribution can be written as:
Pr(D|D̃) = ρ+ (1− ρ)Pr(D), P r(N |D̃) = (1− ρ)Pr(N).
4 The assumption that the manufacturer recalls all products sold up to the point of recall is consistent with Toyota’s
recall in 2009-2010 due to the unintended acceleration defect. Toyota recalled vehicles manufactured as early as 2004
to those manufactured in 2009-2010 (Vlasic and Bunkley 2009, Bunkley 2010). Note that we assume that the unit
recall cost r is independent of the expected harm h, because a defect with significant harm does not necessarily result
in a high recall cost. For instance, GM could fix the faulty ignition switch that led to 124 deaths and 275 injuries,
and eventually led to a recall of 2.6 million vehicles in 2014, for only 57 cents per vehicle (Isidore 2014).
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Table 1 Summary of Notation
Symbols Description
t, t̂∈ [0,1] Time variable (t) and time of voluntary investigation (t̂)
v ∈ [0, v̄] Consumer valuation of the product (random variable)
f(v), F (v) Density and cumulative distribution function of consumer valuation v
g(t̂) Density of the time of voluntary investigation t̂
p Unit price of the product
d(p) Consumer demand rate without investigation announcement
d(p,h) Consumer demand rate during investigation with public announcement
{D,N} True state of the product: D means defective and N means non-defective
s∈ {D̃, Ñ} Manufacturer’s private signal: D̃ means defective and Ñ means non-defective
ρ∈ [0,1] Reliability of the signal s
h∈ (0, h̄] Expected harm per product (probability of occurrence × impact)
r Recall cost for each unit of product
K1h+K2 Penalty for a cover-up, where K1,K2 ≥ 0
θ ∈ [0,1] Probability that regulator finds manufacturer’s cover-up from voluntary investigation
α∈ [0,1] When the regulator never investigates:
(The probability of consumers filing and winning a lawsuit)
× (The fraction of the harm for which the manufacturer is held liable)
{R,NR} The manufacturer’s action space: R represents reporting, and NR not reporting
{I,NI} The regulator’s action space: I represents immediate investigation and
NI no immediate investigation
C (> 0) Regulator’s cost of investigation
l ∈ (0,1) Expected duration of the regulator’s investigation
Before presenting the manufacturer’s expected profit and the regulator’s objective function in
§3.1 and §3.2 respectively, we remark on our assumptions. First, we assume that there is positive
demand during the investigation period (i.e., v̄ > p+ h̄), and that all consumers take into account
the expected harm h when making purchase decisions during this period. In general, negative
rumors or publicity (e.g., investigation announcements, product recalls, negative reviews) tend to
reduce consumers’ valuation and hence sales (Tybout et al. 1981, Berger et al. 2010, Grafton et al.
1981). It is easy to extend our analysis to the case where only a fraction of consumers take into
account such investigation. Second, our demand model assumes that no consumers arrive before
t= 0. Relaxing this assumption would influence both countries’ policies in the same way, and thus
it would not affect our qualitative insights. Table 1 summarizes the notation.
3.1. Manufacturer’s Expected Profit
We focus on the case where the manufacturer receives a private signal of defect, s= D̃, because
when the manufacturer receives s= Ñ , there is nothing for the manufacturer to report. We examine
three scenarios for each of the two countries: (i) the manufacturer reports a potential defect and
the regulator immediately investigates, (ii) the manufacturer reports a potential defect but the
regulator does not immediately investigate, and (iii) the manufacturer does not report. We use
superscripts US and UK to denote the country and subscripts (R,I), (R,NI), and (NR) to denote
the scenarios (i), (ii), and (iii), respectively.
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Under scenario (i) and U.S. policy, the manufacturer’s expected profit is
πUS(R,I) = p[ld(p,h) + (1− l)d(p)]−Pr(D | D̃) · (r+h)ld(p,h). (1)
The first term in (1) is the manufacturer’s sales revenue. The demand rate is d(p,h) for l period
during the regulator’s investigation and d(p) for the remaining (1− l) period. The second term is the
expected recall and liability cost. The manufacturer’s posterior probability of defect is Pr(D | D̃).
If the product is found defective, the manufacturer incurs the unit recall cost r and has to fully
compensate consumers for the expected harm, h, they suffer from defective products sold. Note
that, in (1), we take an expectation of the manufacturer’s profit over the investigation lead time
after taking all other expectations. Since all resulting expressions are linear in the lead time, we
just use the mean lead time l ∈ (0,1). Under the U.K. policy, the manufacturer’s expected profit is
the same except that the demand rate d(p) is unaffected by the investigation and hence,
πUK(R,I) = p · d(p)−Pr(D | D̃) · (r+h)ld(p). (2)
Under scenario (ii) and U.S. policy, the manufacturer’s expected profit is
πUS(R,NI) = p · d(p)−Pr(D | D̃)
[∫ 1−l
0
lp(d(p)− d(p,h))g(t̂ |D)dt̂
+
∫ 1−l
0
(r+h)(d(p)t̂+ d(p,h)l)g(t̂ |D)dt̂+αh · d(p)Pr(t̂= 1 |D)
]
. (3)
In (3), the first term is the expected revenue when there is no defect, and the second term is the
expected loss when there exists a defect. Inside the square bracket, the first term is the expected
revenue loss due to demand decrease during the regulator’s voluntary investigation, the second term
is the expected recall and liability costs when the regulator investigates, and the last term is the
expected liability cost when the regulator never investigates. Under U.K. policy, the manufacturer’s
expected revenue is unaffected by the investigation and hence,
πUK(R,NI) = p · d(p)−Pr(D | D̃)
[∫ 1−l
0
(r+h)(t̂+ l)d(p)g(t̂ |D)dt̂+αh · d(p)Pr(t̂= 1 |D)
]
. (4)
Under scenario (iii), for both the U.S. and U.K., the manufacturer’s expected profit is the same
as in scenario (ii), π(R,NI), except that the manufacturer has to pay a penalty to the regulator if
he finds out that the manufacturer covered up a defect signal; that is,
πj(NR) = π
j
(R,NI)−Pr(D | D̃) · θ(K1h+K2)
∫ 1−l
0
g(t̂ |D)dt̂, for j = US or UK. (5)
Note that the manufacturer fully compensates consumer harm whenever the regulator’s inves-
tigation (either immediate or voluntary) discovers a defect in any scenario, but pays a penalty to
the regulator only when the regulator discovers the manufacturer’s cover-up in scenario (iii).
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3.2. Regulator’s Objective Function
We assume the regulator’s objective is to maximize the social welfare W = π+ S −Γ, where π is
the manufacturer’s expected profit, S is the expected consumer surplus, and Γ is the regulator’s
expected cost. We now derive social welfare for scenarios (i), (ii), and (iii) introduced in §3.1.
Under scenario (i) and U.S. policy, the expected consumer surplus is
SUS(R,I) = l
∫ v̄
p+h
(v− p−h)f(v)dv+ (1− l)
∫ v̄
p
(v− p)f(v)dv, (6)
where the first and second terms correspond to the consumer surplus during and after the regu-
lator’s investigation, respectively. In the first term, consumer surplus is obtained from comparing
the temporarily decreased valuation v−h and the price p. As before, we use the mean lead time l
due to linearity. Note that the consumer harm does not affect consumer surplus under scenario (i)
because consumers are fully compensated by the manufacturer. Instead, consumer harm appears
in the manufacturer’s expected profit as a cost; see the second term of the manufacturer’s expected
profit in (1). Under U.K. policy, the expected consumer surplus is the same except that the demand
rate d(p) is unaffected by the investigation; that is, SUK(R,I) =
∫ v̄
p
(v−p)f(v)dv. Under both countries’
policies, the regulator’s expected cost is ΓUS(R,I) = Γ
UK
(R,I) =C.
Under scenario (ii) and U.S. policy, the expected consumer surplus is
SUS(R,NI) = Pr(D | D̃)
[∫ 1−l
0
g(t̂ |D)dt̂
(
(1− l)
∫ v̄
p
(v− p)f(v)dv+ l
∫ v̄
p+h
(v− p−h)f(v)dv
)
+Pr(t̂= 1 |D)
(∫ v̄
p
(v− p)f(v)dv− (1−α)hd(p)
)]
+Pr(N | D̃)
∫ v̄
p
(v− p)f(v)dv. (7)
The first and second terms give the expected consumer surplus when the product is defective
and non-defective, respectively. Inside the square bracket, the first term corresponds to the case
when the regulator voluntarily investigates at a later time, and the second term the case when the
regulator never investigates. In the former case, consumers get fully compensated for the harm by
the manufacturer, and thus consumer surplus is unaffected by the actual harm. In the latter case,
consumers get compensated for only a fraction α of the harm, and hence the consumer surplus
decreases by a fraction (1−α) of the expected harm consumers suffer, while the rest of the harm
appears as a cost to the manufacturer; see the last term inside the square bracket in (3). Under
U.K. policy, the demand rate d(p) is unaffected by investigation and hence,
SUK(R,NI) =
∫ v̄
p
(v− p)f(v)dv−Pr(D | D̃) ·Pr(t̂= 1 |D) · (1−α)hd(p). (8)
Under both countries’ policies, the regulator’s expected cost is ΓUS(R,NI) = Γ
UK
(R,NI) = Pr(D | D̃) ·∫ 1−l
0
g(t̂ | D)dt̂ · C, where the cost of investigation, C, is multiplied by the probability that the
regulator will conduct a voluntary investigation later.
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Under scenario (iii), the expected social welfare coincides with that under scenario (ii). The only
difference between these two scenarios is the penalty payment, which is a a transfer payment from
the manufacturer to the regulator, and thus cancels out in the social welfare calculation.
Finally, it is important to notice that our formulation of social welfare accounts for consumer
harm at face value through either the manufacturer’s profit or a combination of the manufac-
turer’s profit and the consumer surplus, depending on whether the manufacturer compensates the
consumer harm fully or only partially.
In §4, we characterize the regulator’s best response to the manufacturer who reports a potential
defect. In §5, using the result in §4, we derive subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the manufac-
turer’s decision on whether to report a potential defect.
4. The Regulator’s Investigation Decision
When the manufacturer reports a potential defect, the regulator investigates immediately if doing
so generates higher social welfare; i.e., if W(R,I) ≥W(R,NI). We assume that the regulator chooses to
investigate immediately when he is indifferent between the two options. The following proposition
characterizes the regulator’s best response in both countries.
Proposition 1. Suppose the manufacturer reported a potential defect. There exist real num-
bers hUSI , h
UK
I ∈ (0, h̄) and functions ρUSI (h) : [hUSI , h̄]→ [0,1] and ρUKI (h) : [hUKI , h̄]→ [0,1] (where
ρUSI (h
US
I ) = 1 and ρ
UK
I (h
UK
I ) = 1) such that:
(i) When h ≥ hUSI (h ≥ hUKI ), the regulator investigates immediately if and only if ρ ≥ ρUSI (h)
(ρ≥ ρUKI (h)) in the U.S. (U.K.)
(ii) When h< hUSI (h< h
UK
I ), the regulator does not investigate immediately in the U.S. (U.K.)
Figure 3 illustrates the thresholds hUSI and h
UK
I and threshold functions ρ
US
I (h) and ρ
UK
I (h)
characterized in Proposition 1. The parameter values in all figures are those estimated for Toyota’s
sudden unintended acceleration defect in Online Appendix B. The U.S. and U.K. regulators find
it socially optimal to investigate immediately only on the upper right side of the threshold func-
tions, ρUSI (h) and ρ
UK
I (h), respectively. Therefore, in both countries, the regulator investigates the
alleged defect only if the expected harm h and the reliability of the signal ρ are sufficiently high.
Figure 3 suggests that the U.S. regulator is more reluctant to investigate immediately than the
U.K. regulator. We analytically establish this result under some sufficient conditions.5
Corollary 1. Suppose the manufacturer reported a potential defect. If r ≤ v̄ − 3
2
h̄, then the
following holds: If the U.S. regulator finds it optimal to investigate immediately, i.e., WUS(R,I) ≥
WUS(R,NI), then so does the U.K. regulator, i.e., W
UK
(R,I) ≥WUK(R,NI).
5 Note that the condition in Corollary 1, r≤ v̄− 3
2
h̄, is only a sufficient condition and is likely to hold for a wide range
of parameters, because r < p< v̄− h̄ by assumption (see §3). For instance, this condition holds under the parameter
values we estimated for Toyota’s sudden unintended acceleration defect in Online Appendix B.
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Figure 3 The Regulator’s Decision in Response to the Manufacturer’s Reporting
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Note. All figures in this paper use the following parameter values: p= 2,000, v̄ = 4,000, h= 125, h̄= 500, r = 250,
K1 = 0.3, K2 = 37.5, C = 0.056, l= 0.2, θ= 0.2, α= 0.2, and Pr(D) = 0.01.
We now discuss the intuition for the U.K. regulator’s decision characterized in Proposition 1. For
small expected harm h, the U.K. regulator finds it socially optimal not to investigate immediately
in order to avoid the investigation cost as well as the recall cost if the defect exists, knowing that
the potential harm to consumers would be small and that he is unlikely to investigate at a later
time a potential defect with such small expected harm. In addition, when the reliability ρ is small,
the U.K. regulator is reticent to investigate immediately in order to avoid the fixed cost of an
investigation given that the posterior probability of defect is small. Note, however, that the effect of
reliability ρ on the U.K. threshold function is very small for the Toyota example; i.e., the threshold
function ρUKI (h) is almost vertical around h
UK
I . This is because the investigation cost is very small
compared to the recall cost and expected harm.
The U.S. regulator is more reluctant to investigate immediately than the U.K. regulator, as shown
in Corollary 1, because in the U.S. the public announcement of an on-going investigation reduces
consumers’ demand, thereby having a negative impact on consumer surplus and manufacturer’s
profit, whereas this is not the case in the U.K. Although the public announcement has benefits
of reducing consumer harm and potential recall costs, these benefits exceed the aforementioned
downside only when the expected harm h, recall cost r, and reliability of the signal ρ are all
sufficiently high. Therefore, although the U.S. regulator makes public announcements with good
intentions to reduce potential consumer harm and recall cost, these announcements make the U.S.
regulator more cautious than the U.K. counterpart in initiating an investigation, especially when
the recall cost r is low (as stated in Corollary 1) and when the expected harm h or the reliability
of the signal ρ is low (as stated in Proposition 1).
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Figure 4 Equilibrium Outcomes in the U.S.
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5. The Manufacturer’s Cover-Up Decision
Anticipating the best response of the regulator characterized in §4, the manufacturer decides
whether to report a potential defect to the regulator or not in order to maximize her expected
profit. When the manufacturer is indifferent between the two options, we assume that she reports a
potential defect. We first characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under the U.S. policy.
Proposition 2. In the U.S., there exist a real number hUSR ∈ (0, h̄) and a function ρUSR (h) :
[hUSR , h̄]→ [0,1] (where ρUSR (hUSR ) = 1) such that the unique equilibrium outcomes are as follows:
(i) If h≥max{hUSI , hUSR } and ρ≥max{ρUSI (h), ρUSR (h)}, then the manufacturer reports a potential
defect and the regulator investigates it immediately.
(ii) If h< hUSI or {h≥ hUSI and ρ< ρUSI (h)}, then the manufacturer reports a potential defect but
the regulator does not investigate it immediately.
(iii) If {hUSI ≤ h < hUSR and ρ≥ ρUSI (h)} or {h≥ hUSR and ρUSI (h)≤ ρ < ρUSR (h)}, then the manu-
facturer does not report and therefore the regulator does not investigate immediately.
We discuss Proposition 2 using Figure 4. In Region (ii), we know from Proposition 1 that the
regulator’s best response is not to investigate immediately even if the manufacturer reports a
potential defect. Anticipating this, the manufacturer always reports a potential defect because,
by doing so, she can avoid the penalty levied if the regulator’s voluntary investigation at a later
time finds the manufacturer’s cover-up. In both Regions (i) and (iii), the regulator’s best response
is to investigate immediately upon receiving a report on a potential defect. Anticipating this, in
Region (iii), in which either the expected harm h (for a fixed ρ) or the reliability of the signal ρ (for
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Figure 5 Equilibrium Outcomes in the U.K.
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a fixed h) is lower than in Region (i), the manufacturer decides to cover up the potential defect.
This is because of two main reasons. First, when the expected harm h is lower, there is a lower risk
that the regulator will conduct a voluntary investigation at a later time. Therefore, there is a higher
chance that the manufacturer can get away with the cover-up. Second, when the reliability of the
signal ρ is lower, it is less certain that the defect actually exists and thus the manufacturer chooses
not to report a potential defect to avoid the impact of the regulator’s investigation announcement
on consumer demand and thus on the manufacturer’s profit.
We now characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the U.K.
Proposition 3. In the U.K., there exists a real number hUKR ∈ (0, h̄) such that the unique equi-
librium outcomes are as follows:
(i) If h≥max{hUKI , hUKR } and ρ≥ ρUKI (h), then the manufacturer reports a potential defect and
the regulator investigates it immediately.
(ii) If h < hUKI or {h≥ hUKI and ρ < ρUKI (h)}, then the manufacturer reports a potential defect
but the regulator does not investigate it immediately.
(iii) If hUKI ≤ h < hUKR and ρ≥ ρUKI (h), then the manufacturer does not report and therefore the
regulator does not investigate immediately.
We discuss Proposition 3 using Figure 5, which employs the same notation for Regions (i), (ii),
and (iii) as Figure 4 for the U.S case. The main difference from the U.S. case is that Regions
(i) and (iii) in the U.K. equilibrium are separated by a vertical line, h = hUKR ; that is, the U.K.
manufacturer’s decision to cover up depends only on the expected harm and not on the reliability
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of the private signal. The intuition is that in the U.K., all investigations are confidential and hence
do not have an impact on consumer demand. Consequently, the manufacturer in the U.K. is not
concerned about the reliability of the information when making a decision whether to cover up or
not.6 By contrast, the manufacturer in the U.S. is less inclined to report a potential defect when
the reliability of her private signal is lower, in order to avoid a demand drop.
We next compare the equilibrium outcomes of the two countries in Figure 6, which we obtain by
overlapping Figures 4 and 5. We observe that the manufacturer covers up a potential defect in both
countries in Region I. Therefore, in this region, neither of the two countries’ policies is effective
in inducing the manufacturer to report a potential defect. In Regions II and III, however, the two
countries’ policies lead to different outcomes: In Region II only the U.S. manufacturer covers up,
whereas in Region III only the U.K. manufacturer covers up.7 Note that, in Region III, although
the manufacturer in the U.K. covers up the potential defect to avoid the regulator’s immediate
investigation, the U.S. regulator would not have initiated an immediate investigation even if the
manufacturer had reported the potential defect. By contrast, in Region II the manufacturer in the
U.S. covers up a potential defect that both the U.S. and the U.K. regulators would have investigated
immediately. Therefore, Region II poses a more serious concern than Region III.
Overall, our results suggest that the U.S. policy induces fewer investigations and more cover-
ups of potential defects with significant harm than the U.K. policy. This directly goes against
the original purpose of the U.S. policy: The public announcements of ongoing investigations are
intended to provide early information to the public so that consumers can avoid harm. However, our
analysis reveals that these announcements have unintended consequences by making the regulator
reluctant to initiate investigations (as per Corollary 1) and inducing the manufacturer to cover up
potential defects with significant harm (as in Region II of Figure 6).8
6 A more detailed intuition is as follows. Ex post, there are two cases. The first case is when the defect does exist.
This case happens with the posterior probability Pr(D | D̃), which increases with the reliability of signal ρ. In this
case, if the U.K. manufacturer chose to cover up a potential defect, she may incur a penalty cost; or if the U.K.
manufacturer chose to report it to the regulator, she incurs the recall and liability cost. The second case is when
the defect does not exist. This case happens with probability (1−Pr(D | D̃)). In this case, regardless of whether the
manufacturer chose to cover it up or report it to the regulator, the U.K. manufacturer does not incur any penalty
or recall/liability costs. Taken together, under either option, the U.K. manufacturer’s expected profit depends on ρ
through Pr(D | D̃)× (cost). Therefore, when determining which option leads to a higher expected profit, ρ does not
play a role.
7 Technically, if hUKR > h
US
R , there exists an additional small region (defined by h
US
R ≤ h < hUKR and ρ≥ ρUSR (h)) in
which the U.K. policy induces a cover-up, while the U.S. policy induces the manufacturer to report a potential defect
followed by a regulator’s immediate investigation. We can characterize a sufficient condition under which this region
exists, and interpret this region similarly.
8 Note that the manufacturer in the U.S. may reduce her price following an investigation announcement to compensate
for the drop in consumer demand. While this would alleviate the negative impact of an investigation announcement
on both social welfare and manufacturer’s profit, it is clear that this impact will continue to be negative in the U.S.
By contrast, investigations are not announced in the U.K. Because our focus is on the comparison between the two
countries’ policies, the manufacturer’s ability to adjust her price will not change our main insights.
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Figure 6 Comparison of Equilibrium Outcomes in the U.S. and the U.K.
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In this section, we have compared the two countries’ policies in terms of incidence of manufacturer
cover-ups. We now turn to social welfare.
6. Social Welfare
We first compare social welfare in the two cases where both countries’ policies lead to the same
decisions in equilibrium.
Proposition 4. The social welfare under the U.S. and U.K. policies satisfy the following:
(i) Suppose that, in both countries, the manufacturer does not report a potential defect or the
regulator does not investigate immediately even if the manufacturer reported. Then, social
welfare is higher under the U.S. policy if and only if r+ (3/2)h> v̄.
(ii) Suppose that, in both countries, the manufacturer reports a potential defect and the regulator
investigates it immediately. Then, social welfare is higher under the U.S. policy if and only if
(1/2)h+Pr(D | D̃)(r+h)> v̄.
Proposition 4(i) implies that when the manufacturer does not report a potential defect (scenario
(NR)) or the regulator does not investigate immediately upon receiving a report (scenario (R,NI))
(leftmost light-green region in Figure 7), social welfare is higher in the U.S. if and only if the
expected harm level h and the recall cost r are sufficiently high. To gain intuition about this result,
it suffices to study scenario (NR) because the social welfare for scenarios (NR) and (R,NI) is
identical as explained in §3.2. Note also that the regulator’s expected cost Γ(NR) is identical under
both countries’ policies. Consequently, we need to compare only the expected consumer surplus
S(NR) and the manufacturer’s expected profit π(NR) under each country’s policy in scenario (NR).
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Figure 7 Regions in Which Both Countries’ Policies Have the Same or Different Effects
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First, the expected consumer surplus S(NR) is always higher in the U.K. because consumer
demand is unaffected by the regulator’s investigation unlike in the U.S.9 Note that even if the
manufacturer covers up a potential defect, the regulator may initiate a voluntary investigation
at a later time, triggering a reduction in consumer demand. Consequently, as h increases, the
difference between the two countries’ expected consumer surplus, SUK(NR)−SUS(NR), increases. Second,
it is possible to show that the manufacturer’s expected profit π(NR) is higher in the U.S. if both the
expected harm h and recall cost r are sufficiently high. Unlike in the U.K., in the U.S. the demand
drop during a voluntary investigation reduces the manufacturer’s revenue, but this demand drop
also reduces the manufacturer’s recall and liability costs because there are fewer products to recall
on the market. When both h and r are sufficiently high, the savings in recall and liability costs
compensate the reduction in revenue, and the manufacturer’s expected profit is higher in the U.S.
Combining consumer surplus and manufacturer profit, we find that, if both h and r are sufficiently
high, then the U.S. policy leads to a higher social welfare than the U.K. policy by compensating a
lower consumer surplus with a higher manufacturer’s profit.
Proposition 4(ii) implies that when the manufacturer reports and the regulator investigates
immediately (scenario (R,I), upper-right light-green region in Figure 7), the social welfare is higher
in the U.S. if and only if the posterior probability of defect Pr(D | D̃) as well as h and r is sufficiently
9 We can ignore consumer harm when comparing consumer surplus, because consumer harm affects both countries’
consumer surplus in the same way. Suppose the true state is D. If the regulator initiates an investigation and finds
a defect, then the manufacturer will be required to compensate consumers for all the harm they suffered. Thus,
consumer surplus is unaffected by the harm. If the regulator does not investigate at all, under both countries policies,
the same number of consumers buy the product, sue the firm, and get compensated for α fraction of the harm.
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high. (Note that this condition in Proposition 4(ii) is the same as that in Proposition 4(i) when
Pr(D | D̃) = 1.) The rationale behind this result is the same as that for scenario (NR) except the
following. In the U.S., under scenario (R,I), the consumer demand and manufacturer’s revenue
drop with certainty, unlike under scenario (NR) in which they drop only if the regulator initiates
a voluntary investigation. Yet, the manufacturer incurs the recall and liability costs only when the
defect actually exists, i.e., with probability Pr(D | D̃). Therefore, the savings in recall and liability
costs compensate the reduction in revenue only when Pr(D | D̃) as well as h and r is sufficiently
high.10
These results highlight that even if the two countries’ policies lead to the same decisions in
equilibrium, their implications for social welfare may differ. In particular, the U.S. policy achieves
higher social welfare than the U.K. policy for serious defects, i.e., when the expected harm h, the
recall cost r, and the likelihood of having a defect, Pr(D | D̃), are all high. Otherwise, the U.K.
policy achieves higher social welfare. To gauge how likely the U.S. policy is to result in higher social
welfare, we consider the parameter values estimated for the Toyota example in Online Appendix B.
We find that the conditions in Proposition 4 do not hold for these parameter values because we
have r + (3/2)h = 437.5 6> v̄ = 4,000. Considering that Toyota’s sudden unintended acceleration
defect was such a serious issue, one may infer that the two conditions in Proposition 4 are unlikely
to hold for most defects in reality.
Finally, we compare the social welfare when the two countries’ policies lead to different outcomes
in equilibrium.
Proposition 5. Suppose that we are in the middle dark-gray region in Figure 7. That is, in
the U.K., the manufacturer reports a potential defect and the regulator investigates it immediately,
while in the U.S. the manufacturer does not report a potential defect, or even if she does, the
regulator does not investigate it immediately. Then, there exists a function ρUKW (h) : [h
UK
R , h̄]→ R
such that the U.K. social welfare is higher than the U.S. social welfare if and only if the reliability
of the signal satisfies ρ> ρUKW (h).
We numerically observe that ρUKW (h) is close to the investigation threshold ρ
UK
I (h) for a broad
range of parameters. Because the reliability in this region is bounded below by ρUKI (h), we infer
that social welfare is likely to be higher under the U.K. policy in this entire region. For instance,
for the parameter values estimated for the Toyota example in Figure 7, we have that ρUKW (h)< 0
and ρUKI (h) = 0, implying that social welfare is indeed higher under the U.K. policy in this entire
region.
10 To see why the condition in Proposition 4(i) does not depend on Pr(D|D̃), note that the regulator initiates a
voluntary investigation only if a defect exists. Therefore, the social welfare under the two countries’ policies differs
only if the defect actually exists; that is, with probability Pr(D|D̃). If a defect does exist, then the only difference
between the two countries’ policies is the impact of investigation announcement, which is independent of Pr(D|D̃).
As a result, the difference in expected welfare does not depend on Pr(D|D̃).
Cho, DeMiguel, and Hwang: Cover-Up of Vehicle Defects 21
Figure 8 Social Welfare Comparison
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Expected harm (h)
1440
1450
1460
1470
1480
1490
1500
1510
So
ci
al
 w
el
fa
re
Social welfare 
in the U.S.
Social welfare 
in the U.K.
Cover-up 
in the U.K.
!"#$
(a) Social Welfare When ρ= 0.2
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(b) Social Welfare When ρ= 0.8
In summary, the U.K. policy generally induces higher social welfare than the U.S. policy, except
for defects that may cause very serious harm to consumers and with very high product recall costs.
To get a better sense of how likely it is for the U.K. policy to achieve higher social welfare than the
U.S. policy, we illustrate social welfare under the two countries’ policies for the parameter values
estimated for the Toyota example in Figures 8. In Figure 8(a), the private signal has a low reliability
(ρ= 0.2), and cover-ups could occur only in the U.K., whereas in Figure 8(b), the private signal
has a high reliability (ρ= 0.8), and cover-ups could occur in both countries (as can also be seen in
Figure 6). In both figures, the U.K. social welfare is higher than the U.S. social welfare irrespective
of the reliability of signal ρ and the expected harm h. In fact, the U.K. social welfare is very similar
to the U.S. social welfare for h≤ hUKR = 112, but the U.K. social welfare becomes increasingly larger
than the U.S. social welfare as h increases, for h> hUKR = 112.
11 Although Proposition 4 indicates
that the U.S. policy generates higher social welfare for serious issues with high expected harm h
and high recall cost r, we observe that both h and r should be significantly higher than the Toyota
example, in order for the U.S. social welfare to be higher. For instance, in the Toyota example, if
we change h̄= 500 to 2,000 and r = 250 to 1,900, while keeping all other parameter values fixed,
then the U.S. social welfare is higher when ρ = 0.8 and h ≥ 1,902. In this case, the U.S. social
welfare initially decreases with h as in Figure 8(b), but eventually starts increasing with h when
h≥ 1,567 and exceeds the U.K. social welfare when h≥ 1,902.
11 Kinks exist at h= hUKR and h
US
R , for which the manufacturer is indifferent between covering up and reporting a
potential defect. Thus, at these points, the manufacturer’s expected profit is continuous, but social welfare is not.
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Figure 9 Consumer Harm Comparison
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(a) Consumer Harm When ρ= 0.2
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Expected harm (h)
10
20
30
40
50
60
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 to
ta
l c
on
su
m
er
 h
ar
m
Cover-up 
in the U.K.
Cover-up 
in the U.S.
Consumer harm
in the U.K.
Consumer harm
in the U.S.
(b) Consumer Harm When ρ= 0.8
A cautionary note is that although the U.K. policy generally achieves higher social welfare, either
the U.K. or the U.S. policy may induce lower expected consumer harm depending on the equilibrium
outcome. Figures 9(a) and 9(b) illustrate the expected consumer harm with the parameter values
of Figures 8(a) and 8(b), respectively (see Online Appendix D.5 for the formulation of consumer
harm). In both Figures 9(a) and 9(b), the expected consumer harm in the U.K. is slightly higher
than that in the U.S. for the expected harm h≤ hUKR = 112 (although the difference is not clearly
noticeable). When h > hUKR = 112, the consumer harm in the U.K. is still higher than that in
the U.S. except two cases: i) when the U.K. regulator investigates a reported potential defect
immediately while the U.S. regulator does not (i.e., h > hUKR = 112 in Figure 9(a)) and ii) when
only the manufacturer in the U.S. covers up a potential defect (i.e., 112<h< 152 in Figure 9(b)).
7. Extensions
In Online Appendix C, we explore various extensions of our model to examine the robustness of our
main insights. Overall, although each extension affects our results in different ways, we verify that
our main insight continues to hold: In the U.S., the regulator remains less likely to investigate and
the manufacturer remains more likely to cover up defects with significant harm than in the U.K.
We provide a brief summary of these extensions, while referring the readers to Online Appendix C
for more details.
We enrich our model of consumers as follows. In §C.1, we consider an extension where consumers
are sophisticated enough to correctly assess the posterior probability of the existence of a defect,
Pr(D | D̃), and thus their decreased valuation during the U.S. regulator’s investigation is v−Pr(D |
D̃) · h instead of v − h. In this extension, the cover-up decision of the manufacturer in the U.S.
becomes less sensitive to the reliability of signal ρ than in the base model. In §C.2, we model
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consumers’ risk aversion in perceiving potential harm. In this extension, in the U.S., the regulator
becomes more reluctant to investigate and the manufacturer covers up significant defects with
higher likelihood of existence than in the base model.
We also extend our analysis by considering various scenarios for consumer demand. As discussed
in §2, there is empirical evidence that manufacturers experience a short-term drop in consumer
demand after a product recall. In §C.3, we analyze this case, and find that manufacturers in
both countries cover up potential defects with more significant harm and regulators become more
reluctant to immediately investigate a potential defect than in the base model. In §C.4, we consider
the case in which consumer demand drops temporarily after a cover-up is revealed. We find that
manufacturers in both countries become less likely to cover up potential defects than in the base
model. In §C.5, we consider another plausible scenario under which consumers may be able to
purchase a substitute product during investigation in the U.S. In this extension, the U.S. regulator
becomes more willing to immediately investigate a potential defect than in the base model.
As for the regulator, in §C.6, we consider an alternative objective function in which the regulator
puts more emphasis on reducing consumer harm than maximizing social welfare. In this case,
in both countries, regulators become more likely to investigate a potential defect immediately,
but manufacturers cover up more potential defects than in the base model. In our base model,
we assume the regulator’s voluntary investigation timing, t̂, is uniformly distributed. In §C.7, we
extend our analysis to a linearly increasing (or decreasing) distribution which represents the case
where a defect has a lower probability of causing harm but with a larger impact of the harm
than the uniform case. We find that such an increasing distribution reduces the overall amount of
cover-ups in both countries.
Finally, in §C.8 we analyze the case in which the manufacturer may conduct her own internal
investigation after deciding to cover up her potential defect or after observing the regulator’s
decision not to investigate. In this extension, the manufacturer in the U.S. tends to cover up more
potential defects with even more significant harm than in the base model.
8. Policy Recommendations and Conclusion
Our analysis demonstrates that the U.S. policy offers advantages and disadvantages compared to
the U.K. policy. An advantage of the U.S policy is that it provides early information about potential
defects to consumers, so that consumers can take this information into consideration when making
purchasing decisions. This could decrease the number of consumers who purchase the product and
may suffer from the potential harm. One disadvantage, however, is that the U.S. policy makes
the regulator reluctant to investigate and discourages the manufacturer from reporting a potential
defect with significant harm, compared to the U.K. policy.
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We make four policy recommendations to dissuade manufacturers from covering up potential
defects with significant harm, while allowing for early information to be communicated to con-
sumers. The first two recommendations provide full early information to consumers and the last
two recommendations provide only partial early information to consumers.
First, the regulator could announce his investigations, providing full early information to con-
sumers, and allocate more resources to the investigation of potential defects with significant harm.
These additional resources would shorten the lead time l of the regulator’s investigation, which
would not only reduce the impact of investigation announcement on demand, but also reduce the
number of products to recall if the defect actually exists. Both of these effects would encourage the
manufacturer to report a potential defect rather than to cover it up.
Second, while announcing investigations, the regulator could improve his communication
approach so that consumers correctly understand and interpret the probability that the defect
exists. This would help consumers not to overreact to the investigation announcement and reduce
manufacturers’ incentives to cover up potential defects with significant harm. For the parameters
we estimated for the Toyota recall, we find that if consumers took into account the true posterior
probability of defect, the manufacturer would not cover up potential defects with expected harm
above $165, whereas for our base case the manufacturer covers up defects with expected harm of
up to $227 (see §C.1 in the online appendix). In practice, it is not possible to convey the exact
probability of defect, but a simple color-coding scheme, where, for instance, red corresponds to
highest probability of defect, orange to intermediate, and yellow to low, could be used to improve
communications with consumers.
Third, the regulator could employ a hybrid policy in which he conducts a confidential investi-
gation only when the potential defect could inflict significant harm; that is, providing only partial
early information to consumers. For instance, referring to Figure 6 based on the parameters esti-
mated for the Toyota recall, the regulator should keep confidential the investigation of the sudden
unintended acceleration defect only if its expected harm is greater than hUKR = $112. This would
induce the manufacturers to report potential defects in Region II of Figure 6, thus preventing
manufacturer cover-ups of defects with significant harm, which are the most worrying. This hybrid
policy is also good in terms of social welfare. As we have seen in Figure 8, when the expected harm
h is smaller than hUKR = $112, an investigation announcement does not affect social welfare much,
but when h is greater than hUKR = $112, confidential investigations could generate significantly
higher social welfare.
Our fourth recommendation builds on the current procedure of NHTSA, which conducts two-
phase investigations on alleged defects. The first phase (preliminary evaluation) is “usually resolved
within four months” and its goal is to gather detailed information and “determine whether further
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analysis is warranted.” The second phase (engineering analysis) takes longer and “conducts a
more detailed and complete analysis” (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 2011).
Currently, NHTSA announces his investigations at the beginning of the preliminary evaluation.
Our recommendation is that the regulator makes the preliminary evaluation a silent phase and
announces the investigation only at the beginning of the engineering analysis. This would induce
manufacturers to report potential defects to the regulator in the knowledge that (i) the preliminary
analysis phase does not have an impact on consumer demand and (ii) the regulator may not proceed
with the engineering analysis phase if the preliminary analysis concludes that there is a low chance
that the defect may exist or its expected harm is low.
References
Atasu, Atalay, Luk N Van Wassenhove, Miklos Sarvary. 2009. Efficient take-back legislation. Production and
Operations Management 18(3) 243–258.
Bennett, Jeff. 2014. Recall is first big test for GM chief Barra. The Wall Street Journal (March 5), http:
//www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304360704579419494191216588.
Berger, Jonah, Alan T Sorensen, Scott J Rasmussen. 2010. Positive effects of negative publicity: When
negative reviews increase sales. Marketing Science 29(5) 815–827.
Bunkley, Nick. 2010. Toyota halts sales of 8 models in U.S. for pedal flaw. The New York Times (January
26), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/27/business/27toyota.html.
CBS News. 2010. Toyota “unintended acceleration” has killed 89 (May 25), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/toyota-unintended-acceleration-has-killed-89/.
Chen, Shi, Qinqin Zhang, Yong-Pin Zhou. 2019. Impact of supply chain transparency on sustainability under
NGO scrutiny. Production and Operations Management 28(12) 3002–3022.
Chen, Yuxin, Chakravarthi Narasimhan, Z John Zhang. 2001. Individual marketingg with imperfect tar-
getability. Marketing Science 20(1) 23–41.
Cho, Soo-Haeng, Xin Fang, Sridhar R Tayur, Ying Xu. 2019. Combating child labor: Incentives and infor-
mation transparency in global supply chains. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 21(3)
692–711.
CNBC. 2013. Toyota settles sudden acceleration suit in crash deaths (January 18), http://www.cnbc.com/
id/100390488.
Colak, Ahmet, Robert L Bray. 2019. Why do automakers initiate recalls? A structural econometric game.
Working Paper, Clemson University.
Driver & Vehicle Standards Agency. 2014. Manufacturers’ Guide to Recalls in the UK Automotive Sector.
Grafton, Steven M, George E Hoffer, Robert J Reilly. 1981. Testing the impact of recalls on the demand for
automobiles. Economic Inquiry 19(4) 694–703.
Hoffer, George E, Stephen W Pruitt, Robert J Reilly. 1988. The impact of product recalls on the wealth of
sellers: A reexamination. The Journal of Political Economy 96(3) 663–670.
26 Cho, DeMiguel, and Hwang: Cover-Up of Vehicle Defects
Hora, Manpreet, Hari Bapuji, Aleda V Roth. 2011. Safety hazard and time to recall: the role of recall
strategy, product defect type, and supply chain player in the us toy industry. Journal of Operations
Management 29(7) 766–777.
Hua, Xinyu. 2011. Product recall and liability. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 27(1) 113–136.
Isidore, Chris. 2014. The 57-cent part at the center of GM’s recall crisis. The Washington Post (April 2),
http://money.cnn.com/2014/04/02/news/companies/gm-recall-part/index.html.
Iyer, Ganesh, Chakravarthi Narasimhan, Rakesh Niraj. 2007. Information and inventory in distribution
channels. Management Science 53(10) 1551–1561.
Jarrell, Gregg, Sam Peltzman. 1985. The impact of product recalls on the wealth of sellers. The Journal of
Political Economy 93(3) 512–536.
Kalaignanam, Kartik, Tarun Kushwaha, Meike Eilert. 2013. The impact of product recalls on future product
reliability and future accidents: Evidence from the automobile industry. Journal of Marketing 77(2)
41–57.
Kalkanci, Basak, Erica L Plambeck. 2018. Managing supplier social & environmental impacts with voluntary
vs. mandatory disclosure to investors. Management Science, forthcoming.
Kim, Sang-Hyun. 2015. Time to come clean? Disclosure and inspection policies for green production. Oper-
ations Research 63(1) 1–20.
Kraft, Tim, León Valdés, Yanchong Zheng. 2018. Supply chain visibility and social responsibility: Investi-
gating consumers’ behaviors and motives. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 20(4)
617–636.
Kraft, Tim, León Valdés, Yanchong Zheng. 2019. Motivating supplier social responsibility under incomplete
visibility. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, forthcoming.
Kraft, Tim, Yanchong Zheng, Feryal Erhun. 2013. The NGO’s dilemma: How to influence firms to replace
a potentially hazardous substance. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 15(4) 649–669.
Levinson, Charles, Jeff Bennett, Devlin Barrett. 2014. Toyota to pay $1.2 billion to set-
tle U.S. probe. The Wall Street Journal (March 19), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424052702304256404579449070848399280.
Linebaugh, Kate, Dionne Searcey, Norihiko Shirouzu. 2010. Secretive culture led toy-
ota astray. The Wall Street Journal (February 8), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704820904575055733096312238.html.
Marucheck, Ann, Noel Greis, Carlos Mena, Linning Cai. 2011. Product safety and security in the global
supply chain: Issues, challenges and research opportunities. Journal of Operations Management 29(7)
707–720.
McCarthy, Patrick S. 1996. Market price and income elasticities of new vehicle demands. The Review of
Economics and Statistics 78(3) 543–547.
McCurry, Justin. 2010. Toyota takes $2bn hit from global safety recall. The Guardian (February 4),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/feb/04/toyota-safety-recall-profits.
Miller Jr. 2015. Average personal injury awards in pennsylvania (October 1), https://www.
accidentinjurylawyerblog.com/pennsylvania-average-settlement.html.
Cho, DeMiguel, and Hwang: Cover-Up of Vehicle Defects 27
Mitchell, Josh, Kate Linebaugh. 2010. Toyota agrees to $16.4 million fine. The Wall Street Journal (April
17), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704508904575192873543926804.html.
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 2011. Motor vehicle safety defects and recalls: What
every vehicle owner should know (May), https://www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/documents/
MVDefectsandRecalls.pdf.
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 2014. ODI resume: EA 14-002 (May 12), https://static.
nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2014/INOA-EA14002-1938.PDF.
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 2015a. ODI resume: PE 15-013 (December 4), https:
//static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2015/INCLA-PE15013-7074.PDF.
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 2015b. ODI resume: PE 15-024 (December 9), https:
//static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2015/INCLA-PE15024-3406.PDF.
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 2016. Budget estimates, fiscal year 2017 https://www.
nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/fy2017-nhtsa_cbj_final_02_2016.pdf.
Plambeck, Erica L., Terry A. Taylor. 2016. Supplier evasion of a buyer’s audit: Implications for motivating
supplier social and environmental responsibility. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
18(2) 184–197.
Polinsky, A Mitchell, Steven Shavell. 2012. Mandatory versus voluntary disclosure of product risks. Journal
of Law, Economics, and Organization 28(2) 360–379.
Reilly, Robert J, George E Hoffer. 1983. Will retarding the information flow on automobile recalls affect
consumer demand? Economic Inquiry 21(3) 444–447.
Rubel, Olivier, Prasad A Naik, Shuba Srinivasan. 2011. Optimal advertising when envisioning a product-
harm crisis. Marketing Science 30(6) 1048–1065.
Rushe, Dominic. 2010. Toyota hit by $32.4m fine over recalls. The Guardian (December 21), http://www.
theguardian.com/business/2010/dec/21/toyota-hit-fine-recalls-us-government.
Searcey, Dionne. 2010. Toyota lawyer cites driver error in car deaths. The Wall Street Journal (November
18), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704104104575623012463981650.
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Appendix A: Proof of All Results
Proof of Proposition 1. We show this result for each country separately.
The U.S. Case. For the U.S., the social welfare is calculated as follows:
WUS(R,I) = π
US
(R,I) +S
US
(R,I)−ΓUS(R,I)
= p
(
1− p
v̄
− lh
v̄
)
−Pr(D | D̃)(r+h)l
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WUS(R,I)−WUS(R,NI) = Pr(D | D̃)χ1(h)−
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v̄− 1
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h
)
−C, (9)
where χ1(h) =
h
h̄
C +
(r+h)
2v̄h̄
(
(v̄− p)(h(1 + l)− 2h̄l) + 2lh(h̄−h)
)
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lh2
v̄h̄
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h(h̄−h)(v̄− p)
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If χ1(h)<
lh
v̄
(
v̄− 1
2
h
)
+C, or equivalently, χ̂1(h) = χ1(h)− lhv̄
(
v̄− 1
2
h
)
−C < 0, then WUS(R,I)−WUS(R,NI) < 0 is
always satisfied, because Pr(D | D̃)≤ 1. If χ̂1(h)≥ 0, then WUS(R,I)−WUS(R,NI) ≥ 0 if and only if
ρ≥ ρ′ =
lh(v̄−h/2)/v̄+C
χ1(h)
−Pr(D)
1−Pr(D)
, (11)
since Pr(D | D̃) = ρ + (1− ρ)Pr(D). It is easy to see that χ̂1(h) is a cubic function of h, the coefficient
of the cubic term is negative, χ̂1(0) = χ1(0)−C =− rlv̄ (v̄− p)−C < 0, and χ̂1(h̄) =
(r+h̄)
2v̄
(v̄− p)(1− l)> 0.
Therefore, there exists hUSI ∈ (0, h̄) such that WUS(R,I) −WUS(R,NI) < 0 is satisfied regardless of ρ if and only if
h < hUSI , and W
US
(R,I) −WUS(R,NI) ≥ 0 is satisfied if and only if h ≥ hUSI and ρ ≥ ρUSI (h) = max{ρ′,0}, where
ρUSI (h)∈ [0,1] is a function of h.
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The U.K. Case. For the UK, the social welfare is calculated as follows:
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If χ2(h)<C, or equivalently, χ̂2(h) = χ2(h)−C < 0, then WUK(R,I) −WUK(R,NI) < 0 is always satisfied, because
Pr(D | D̃)≤ 1. If χ̂2(h)≥ 0, then WUK(R,I)−WUK(R,NI) ≥ 0 if and only if
ρ≥ ρ′′ =
C
χ2(h)
−Pr(D)
1−Pr(D)
, (14)
since Pr(D | D̃) = ρ+ (1− ρ)Pr(D). It is straightforward to see that χ̂2(h) is a quadratic function of h,
χ̂2(0) = χ2(0)−C =−rl(1− pv̄ )−C < 0, and χ̂2(h̄) = (r+ h̄)(1−
p
v̄
) 1−l
2
> 0. Therefore, there exists hUKI ∈ (0, h̄)
such that WUK(R,I)−WUK(R,NI) < 0 is satisfied regardless of ρ if and only if h< hUKI , and WUK(R,I)−WUK(R,NI) ≥ 0 is
satisfied if and only if h≥ hUKI and ρ≥ ρUKI (h) = max{ρ′′,0}, where ρUKI (h)∈ [0,1] is a function of h. 
Proof of Corollary 1. We show that if r ≤ v̄ − 3h̄/2, then (WUK(R,I) −WUK(R,NI))− (WUS(R,I) −WUS(R,NI)) ≥ 0.
Using the results in the proof of Proposition 1, we can obtain the following:
(WUK(R,I)−WUK(R,NI))− (WUS(R,I)−WUS(R,NI)) =
hl
2h̄v̄
[
h̄(2v̄−h) +Pr(D | D̃)χ3(h)
]
,
where
χ3(h) = 3h
2− 2h̄r− 2h(h̄− r+ v̄).
Note that χ3(0) =−2h̄r < 0 and χ3(h̄) = h̄(h̄− 2v̄)< 0. Since χ3(h) is quadratic in h and the coefficient of
the quadratic term is positive, we have that χ3(h)< 0 for all h∈ [0, h̄]. Therefore,
(WUK(R,I)−WUK(R,NI))− (WUS(R,I)−WUS(R,NI))≥
hl
2h̄v̄
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h̄(2v̄−h) +χ3(h)
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where
χ̂3(h) = 3h
2− (3h̄+ 2(v̄− r))h+ 2h̄(v̄− r).
Note that χ̂3(h) is a quadratic function achieving the minimum at h= h̄/2+(v̄−r)/3. Furthermore, χ̂3(0) =
2h̄(v̄−r)> 0 and χ̂3(h̄) = 0. It is straightforward to see that if r≤ v̄−3h̄/2, then χ̂3(h) achieves its minimum
at h≥ h̄, and therefore χ̂3(h)≥ 0 for all h∈ [0, h̄]. Hence, if r≤ v̄−3h̄/2, then (WUK(R,I)−WUK(R,NI))− (WUS(R,I)−
WUS(R,NI))≥ 0. 
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Proof of Proposition 2. This proof consists of two steps. In Step 1, we define hUSR and ρ
US
R (h) in such a
way that, when the regulator always investigates immediately, the manufacturer reports a potential defect
if and only if h≥ hUSR and ρ≥ ρUSR (h). In Step 2, we characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Step 1. Defining hUSR and ρ
US
R
(h). Assume that the regulator always investigates immediately. By (1),
the manufacturer’s expected profit from reporting a potential defect is
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Therefore,
πUS(R,I)−πUS(NR) = Pr(D | D̃) ·Ω1(h)−
plh
v̄
, (15)
where
Ω1(h) =−
l
h̄v̄
h3 +
(
K1θ
h̄
+
(1− 2α+ l)
(
1− p
v̄
)
2h̄
+
l
v̄
+
l(p− r)
h̄v̄
)
h2
+
(
K2θ
h̄
+
(2αh̄+ (1 + l)r)
(
1− p
v̄
)
2h̄
+
lr
v̄
− l
(
1− p
v̄
))
h− lr
(
1− p
v̄
)
. (16)
If Ω1(h) < plh/v̄, or equivalently, Ω̂1(h) = Ω1(h) − plh/v̄ < 0, then πUS(R,I) − πUS(NR) < 0 is always satisfied,
because Pr(D | D̃)≤ 1. If Ω̂1(h)≥ 0, then πUS(R,I)−πUS(NR) ≥ 0 if and only if
ρ≥ ρ1 =
1
1−Pr(D)
(
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Ω1(h)
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)
, (17)
because Pr(D | D̃) = ρ+(1−ρ)Pr(D). It is easy to see that Ω̂1(h) is a cubic function of h and the coefficient
of the cubic term is negative. Moreover, Ω̂1(0) = Ω1(0) =−lr(1− p/v̄)< 0 and
Ω̂1(h̄) =
1
2v̄
[
(1− l)(v̄− p)r+ 2K2θv̄+ h̄((1− l)(v̄− p) + 2K1θv̄)
]
> 0. (18)
Thus, there exists hUSR ∈ (0, h̄) such that Ω̂1(h)≥ 0 if and only if h≥ hUSR . Then, πUS(R,I) − πUS(NR) ≥ 0 if and
only if h≥ hUSR and ρ≥ ρUSR (h) = max{ρ1,0}, where ρUSR (h)∈ [0,1] is a function of h satisfying ρUSR (hUSR ) = 1.
Step 2. Characterizing subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We use backward induction to character-
ize the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Let A1 ∈ {R,NR} denote the manufacturer’s strategy, in which
R denotes reporting a potential defect, and NR not reporting. Let (A2,A3) denote the regulator’s strategy,
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in which A2 ∈ {I,NI} and A3 =NI are the regulator’s actions when the manufacturer reports a potential
defect and when the manufacturer does not report, respectively, where I denotes an immediate investigation
and NI no immediate investigation. The equilibrium can be denoted by (A1, (A2,A3)).
First, suppose h< hUSI , or h≥ hUSI and ρ< ρUSI (h). Then, by Proposition 1, the regulator’s best response
is not to investigate immediately even if the manufacturer reports a potential defect. By (5), we have
πUS(R,NI) ≥ πUS(NR). Therefore, the manufacturer always reports a potential defect. Hence, the unique subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium is (R, (NI,NI)).
Second, suppose hUSI ≤ h < hUSR and ρ ≥ ρUSI (h), or h ≥ hUSR and ρUSI (h) ≤ ρ < ρUSR (h). Then, by Propo-
sition 1, when the manufacturer reports a potential defect, the regulator’s best response is to investigate
immediately. However, anticipating this, the manufacturer does not report as we have shown in Step 1.
Therefore, the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is (NR, (I,NI)).
Finally, suppose h≥max{hUSI , hUSR } and ρ≥max{ρUSI (h), ρUSR (h)}. By Proposition 1, when the manufac-
turer reports a potential defect, the regulator’s best response is to investigate immediately. Also, by Step 1,
the manufacturer reports a potential defect even if she anticipates the regulator’s immediate investigation.
Therefore, the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is (R, (I,NI)). 
Proof of Proposition 3. This proof consists of two steps. In Step 1, we define hUKR in such a way that,
when the regulator always investigates immediately, the manufacturer reports a potential defect if and only
if h≥ hUKR . In Step 2, we characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Step 1. Defining hUKR . By (2), the manufacturer’s expected profit from reporting a potential defect is
πUK(R,I) = p · d(p)−Pr(D | D̃) · (r+h)ld(p) = (p−Pr(D | D̃) · (r+h)l)
(
1− p
v̄
)
.
By (5), the manufacturer’s expected profit from not reporting is
πUK(NR) = p · d(p)−Pr(D | D̃)
[∫ 1−l
0
(r+h)(t̂+ l)d(p)g(t̂ |D)dt̂
+θ(K1h+K2)
∫ 1−l
0
g(t̂ |D)dt̂+αh · d(p)Pr(t̂= 1 |D)
]
= p
(
1− p
v̄
)
−Pr(D | D̃)
[
(r+h)
(1 + l)h
2h̄
(
1− p
v̄
)
+ θ(K1h+K2)
h
h̄
+αh
(
1− h
h̄
)(
1− p
v̄
)]
.
Therefore,
πUK(R,I)−πUK(NR) = Pr(D | D̃) ·Ω2(h),
where
Ω2(h) =
[
θK1
h̄
−
(
α
h̄
− (1 + l)
2h̄
)(
1− p
v̄
)]
h2 +
[
θK2
h̄
−
(
l−α− r(1 + l)
2h̄
)(
1− p
v̄
)]
h− rl
(
1− p
v̄
)
. (19)
Note that Ω2(h) is a quadratic function of h, with Ω2(0) =−rl(1− p/v̄)< 0 and
Ω2(h̄) =
1
2v̄
[
(1− l)(v̄− p)(r+ h̄) + 2K2θv̄+ 2K1θv̄h̄
]
> 0. (20)
Therefore, there exists hUKR ∈ (0, h̄) such that πUK(R,I) − πUK(NR) ≥ 0 if and only if h ≥ hUKR . Note that hUKR is
independent of the posterior probability Pr(D | D̃) or the reliability of the signal ρ.
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Step 2. Characterizing subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We characterize the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium following the same approach as Step 2 in the proof of Proposition 2.
First, suppose h< hUKI , or h≥ hUKI and ρ< ρUKI (h). Then, by Proposition 1, the regulator’s best response
is not to investigate immediately even if the manufacturer reports a potential defect. By (5), we have
πUK(R,NI) ≥ πUK(NR). Therefore, the manufacturer always reports a potential defect. Hence, the unique subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium is (R, (NI,NI)).
Second, suppose hUKI ≤ h< hUKR and ρ≥ ρUKI (h). Then, by Proposition 1, when the manufacturer reports
a potential defect, the regulator’s best response is to investigate immediately. However, anticipating this,
the manufacturer does not report as we have shown in Step 1. Therefore, the unique subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium is (NR, (I,NI)).
Finally, suppose h≥max{hUKI , hUKR } and ρ≥ ρUKI (h). By Proposition 1, when the manufacturer reports a
potential defect, the regulator’s best response is to investigate immediately. Also, by Step 1, the manufacturer
reports a potential defect even if she anticipates the regulator’s immediate investigation. Therefore, the
unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is (R, (I,NI)). 
Proof of Proposition 4. When the manufacturer does not report a potential defect, we have that WUS(NR) =
WUS(R,NI) and W
UK
(NR) =W
UK
(R,NI). Using W
US
(R,NI) and W
UK
(R,NI) obtained in the proof of Proposition 1,
WUS(NR)−WUK(NR) =WUS(R,NI)−WUK(R,NI) =−Pr(D | D̃) ·
h2l
2v̄h̄
· (2v̄− 2r− 3h).
Therefore, WUS(NR) >W
UK
(NR) if and only if v̄ < r+
3
2
h.
When the manufacturer reports a potential defect and the regulator investigates it immediately, using
WUS(R,I) and W
UK
(R,I) obtained in the proof of Proposition 1, we have that
WUS(R,I)−WUK(R,I) =−
lh
v̄
[
v̄− 1
2
h−Pr(D | D̃)(r+h)
]
.
Therefore, WUS(R,I) >W
UK
(R,I) if and only if v̄ <
1
2
h+Pr(D | D̃)(r+h). 
Proof of Proposition 5. Using WUS(R,NI) and W
UK
(R,I) obtained in the proof of Proposition 1, we have that
WUK(R,I)−WUS(R,NI) = Pr(D | D̃)χ4(h)−C, where
χ4(h) =
1
2v̄h̄
[
−3lh3− ((1− 3l)v̄− (1− l)p+ 2lr)h2 + (2h̄(1− l)(v̄− p) + (2C + r+ rl)v̄− (1 + l)pr)h− 2h̄lr(v̄− p)
]
.
If χ̂4(h) = χ4(h)−C < 0, then WUK(R,I)−WUS(R,NI) < 0 is always satisfied, because Pr(D | D̃)≤ 1. In this case,
we define ρUKW (h) = 1. If χ̂4(h)≥ 0, then WUK(R,I)−WUS(R,NI) ≥ 0 if and only if
ρ≥ C/χ4(h)−Pr(D)
1−Pr(D)
.
In this case, we define ρUKW (h) =
C/χ4(h)−Pr(D)
1−Pr(D) . 
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Online Appendix
Appendix B: Parameter Values Used in Figures
All figures in the paper use the following parameter values: p= 2,000, v̄ = 4,000, h= 125, h̄= 500, r= 250,
K1 = 0.3, K2 = 37.5, C = 0.056, l = 0.2, θ = 0.2, α= 0.2, and Pr(D) = 0.01. These values are motivated by
Toyota’s sudden unintended acceleration recalls in 2009 and 2010. Toyota Corolla, one of the recalled models,
sells for around $20,000 (base model) in the U.S. We use p= $2,000, because we assume zero production
cost in our model and Toyota’s net income has been around 5-10% of the revenue since 2014.12 We set
v̄ = 2p= $4,000, which produces the price elasticity of demand of −1 in our model. This is in line with the
findings of McCarthy (1996), who estimated that the price elasticity of demand for new vehicles was −0.87.
We use the settlement amounts in lawsuits to measure the expected harm h of Toyota’s sudden unintended
acceleration problem. CBS News (2010) reported that 89 people died and 57 got injured because of this
defect. Although settlement sizes are difficult to estimate because most of them are confidential, Toyota
settled one of the wrongful death claims with $10 millions (CNBC 2013). Also, Miller Jr. (2015) reports that
an average settlement amount for personal injuries in Pennsylvania is around $1 million. Using these two
numbers, we can roughly estimate the total settlement amount to be around 89×$10m +57×$1m = $947m
≈ $1 billion. Since 8 million vehicles had to be recalled, the expected harm per vehicle is h= $1b/8m=$125.
Conservatively, we use h̄= 4h= $500 for the maximum expected harm, but our results are not sensitive to
different values of h̄. Toyota spent $2 billion to recall 8 million vehicles (McCurry 2010), and therefore we
use the per-vehicle recall cost of r= $2b/8m=$250.
To estimate the penalty K1h+K2 and the regulator’s investigation cost C, we need to scale the real-
world numbers to fit to our model. Specifically, Toyota recalled 8 million vehicles, but in our model, the
manufacturer can only sell 0.5 vehicle in the entire selling season due to normalization assuming no demand
drop (because d(p) = 1− p/v̄= 1/2 when v̄= 2p). Roughly, 8 million vehicles in the Toyota case correspond
to 0.5 vehicle in our model, and therefore we need to divide the real penalty and investigation costs by
8m/0.5. Toyota paid a penalty of $1.2 billion for deliberately hiding the defect.13 Therefore, this penalty
corresponds to $1.2b/(8m/0.5) = $75. We assume that half of this penalty is a fixed penalty regardless of
the expected harm. This results in K1 = 0.3 and K2 = 37.5.
As for the investigation cost C, for the 2017 budget, NHTSA requested $47.5 million for its Office of Safety
Defects Investigation (ODI), a department that has 28 employees, 16 of whom conduct formal investigation
(National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 2016). Based on the announcements of on-going investiga-
tions, we found that NHTSA was conducting, on average, 31.7 investigations in any given month between
12 Source: Nasdaq webpage (http://www.nasdaq.com).
13 Note that this penalty was imposed by the Department of Justice for the criminal charge. NHTSA can also impose
a fine on auto-makers for delaying recalls, but this is legally capped at $32.4 million. Toyota indeed paid a fine of $16.4
million to NHTSA in April 2010, and later in the year, paid an additional fine of $32.4 million (Rushe 2010). However,
the fines imposed by NHTSA are a negligible amount compared to $1.2 billion and therefore are not considered in
calculating the parameters.
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August 2015 and January 2016.14 According to NHTSA, most investigations last between 0.33 and 1.33
years. Therefore, assuming that there are 30 on-going investigations at any given time and an investigation
lasts one year on average, we can estimate, by Little’s law, that NHTSA conducts roughly 30 investigations
a year. If we assume that the fraction of the ODI budget that is allocated to investigations is proportional
to the number of employees who conduct those investigations (16 out of 28), an investigation costs $47.5m
×(16/28)/30 = $0.9m. This corresponds to C = $0.9m/(8m/0.5)≈ $0.056 in our model.
Toyota introduces a new generation of Corolla every 4 to 7 years by changing the vehicle design and
components. Assuming that the life-cycle of one generation is 5 years, with the NHTSA’s average investigation
duration of one year, we use l = 1/5 = 0.2 as the average investigation duration in our model. Also, the
prior probability that a new vehicle is defective is generally low (otherwise it would not have passed initial
testings), and hence we set Pr(D) = 0.01; however, we find that our results are not sensitive to the prior and
the shapes and qualitative properties of the figures remain the same with different priors.
Finally, we use θ = 0.2 and α = 0.2. In general, it is difficult to estimate the probability with which the
regulator can find out whether the manufacturer covered up a potential defect, θ, and the fraction of the
manufacturer’s liability when the manufacturer does not recall the product, α. However, again, we find that
the shapes and qualitative properties of the figures do not change much when we vary θ and α.
Appendix C: Extensions
We study the robustness of our main insights in Propositions 1-4 by considering: (1) consumers that use the
posterior probability of defect when adjusting their demand for a product under investigation in the U.S.,
(2) consumer’s risk aversion, (3) a short-term demand drop after a product recall, (4) demand drop after a
cover-up revelation, (5) demand substitution, (6) alternative objective function of the regulator that places
more emphasis on consumer harm, (7) alternative distributions of voluntary investigation timing, and (8) the
manufacturer’s internal investigation. Overall, we find that our main insights are robust to these extensions.
C.1. Consumers’ Use of Posterior Distribution
In the base model, when the regulator announces the investigation of a potential defect, all consumers take
into account its potential harm h and thus the demand rate is reduced from 1− F (p) to 1− F (p+ h). As
mentioned in §3, our main findings also hold for the case where only a fraction of consumers take into account
the potential harm. Both of these models rely on the assumption that it is difficult for regulators to accurately
convey to consumers the exact probability with which a defect exists (i.e., the posterior distribution), and
that consumers have limited ability to interpret probabilities correctly and therefore overreact to the news
of alleged existence of a defect. However, we could envision a situation in which consumers are fully rational
and capable of assessing the exact posterior probability Pr(D | D̃) with which a defect exists. In such case,
the demand rate would change to 1−F (p+Pr(D | D̃)×h), instead of 1−F (p+h).
14 NHTSA’s investigation consists of two phases. The first phase is Preliminary Evaluation, in which ODI collects
information from manufacturers and determines whether further analysis is warranted. The Preliminary Evaluation
is generally resolved within four months. The second phase is Engineering Analysis, in which ODI conducts a more
detailed analysis including inspection, testing, and surveys. This phase generally lasts one year, but it could last
longer for complicated issues (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 2011). We found that NHTSA was
conducting, on average, 23.7 Preliminary Evaluations and 8 Engineering Analyses in any given month between August
2015 and January 2016.
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Figure 10 Equilibrium Outcomes with Consumers’ Use of Posterior Distribution
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Figure 10 illustrates the equilibrium outcomes of this case, using the same parameter values as in previous
figures. The three regions in this figure are separated mainly by the expected harm h, rather than by the
reliability of signal ρ. When ρ is high, Figure 10 looks similar to Figure 6, because the posterior probability
Pr(D | D̃) is high and thus the demand rate reduces almost to 1−F (p+h) under the U.S. policy, similar to
the base model. When ρ is low, however, the demand rate does not decrease much even if there is an on-going
investigation, because Pr(D | D̃) is low. This makes the manufacturer less likely to cover up a potential
defect than when ρ is high. This effect, however, is countervailed by the fact that low Pr(D | D̃) implies that
there is a high chance that the defect actually does not exist, and this makes the manufacturer more likely
to cover up than when ρ is high. As a result, the manufacturer’s cover-up decision depends on the expected
harm h in a similar way to the case when the reliability of signal ρ is high. Therefore, we observe that the
manufacturer in the U.S. covers up more serious issues (i.e., potential defects with higher expected harm)
than the manufacturer in the U.K., and this does not depend much on the reliability of signal.
Note that Region II, in which only the manufacturer in the U.S. covers up a potential defect, has lower
expected harm than Region II does in the base model. Specifically, in Figure 10, the maximum expected
harm of a potential defect that the manufacturer is willing to cover up is $165, whereas this was $227 in the
base model (see Figure 6).
C.2. Consumers’ Risk Aversion
In our base model, we consider risk neutral consumers. We now study the robustness of our findings to the
presence of risk-averse consumers. To model consumers’ risk aversion, we use a mean-standard-deviation
utility function. Specifically, a consumer’s utility from purchase during investigation under the U.S. policy
is v− p− (h+ γσ), where σ is the standard deviation of the harm distribution and γ ≥ 0 is the risk-aversion
parameter. Then, the demand rate during investigation under the U.S. policy is 1−F (p+h+γσ), where we
assume that γσ≤ v̄− p− h̄ to ensure a positive demand rate.
We consider two cases depending on the relationship between the standard deviation σ and the mean h of
the harm distribution. Specifically, we assume that σ is independent of h in the first case and σ is proportional
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Figure 11 Equilibrium Outcomes with Consumers’ Risk Aversion
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to h in the second case. Note that, in the second case, the standard deviation can be represented by σ= τh,
where τ > 0.15 Then, we have that v − p− (h+ γσ) = v − p− (1 + τγ)h = v − p− βh, where β = 1 + τγ,
and thus the demand rate during investigation under the U.S. policy in the second case can be simplified to
1−F (p+βh). We specify that β ∈ [1, (v̄− p)/h̄), where β > 1 means risk aversion and β < (v̄− p)/h̄ ensures
that the positive demand rate assumption (i.e., γσ≤ v̄− p− h̄) holds. Both cases collapse to the base model
if we assume risk neutrality by setting γ = 0.
We observe that, in both cases, the overall structure of the equilibrium remains unaffected by considering
risk-averse consumers. In particular, we verify that Propositions 1, 2, and 3 continue to hold in both cases,
and Proposition 4 also continues to hold with a slight change of conditions (see Appendix D.1 for proofs).16
Figure 11(a) illustrates the equilibrium outcomes when σ is independent of h, where γσ= 125. Figure 11(b)
illustrates the equilibrium outcomes when σ is proportional to h, where β = 2.17 As consumers become more
risk averse, the negative impact of the investigation announcement on demand becomes more significant.
Therefore, in Figures 11(a) and 11(b), the regulator is more reluctant to investigate and the manufacturer
tends to cover up significant defects with higher likelihood of existence than in the base model in Figure 6.
Yet, the underlying intuition behind the regulator’s investigation decision and the manufacturer’s cover-up
decision remains the same: Risk aversion only accentuates the impact of the investigation announcement in
the U.S, while keeping all results under the U.K. policy unchanged. Finally, comparing the equilibria under
the U.S. and U.K. policies, we observe that our main insight continues to hold: in the U.S. the regulator is
less likely to investigate and the manufacturer is more likely to cover up defects with significant harm.
15 This is satisfied, for instance, by the exponential distribution, in which case τ = 1.
16 When σ is independent of h, the condition is v̄ < r+ (3h+ γσ)/2 for Proposition 4(i) and v̄ < (h+ γσ)/2 +Pr(D |
D̃)(r+h) for Proposition 4(ii). When σ is proportional to h, the condition is v̄ < r+ ((2 +β)/2)h for Proposition 4(i)
and v̄ < (β/2)h+Pr(D | D̃)(r+h) for Proposition 4(ii).
17 Note that, using the parameter value of h= $125 we estimated for the Toyota recalls in Online Appendix B, the
parameter values of Figures 11(a) and 11(b) are comparable in the sense that h+ γσ= $250 and βh= $250.
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Figure 12 Equilibrium Outcomes with Short-Term Demand Drop After a Recall
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C.3. Short-Term Demand Drop After a Product Recall
As discussed in §2, there is empirical evidence that manufacturers experience a short-term drop in consumer
demand after a product recall. We can incorporate this effect by assuming that the demand rate drops to
1−F (p+ δh), where δ > 0, after a product recall for ε∈ (0,1) time period. This assumption, however, raises
the issue of what happens if a recall occurs after t= 1− ε, in which case the remaining time period is less
than ε. We consider two cases with different assumptions to deal with this issue.
In the first case, we assume a fixed impact; that is, even if the recall occurs after t= 1− ε, the reductions
in the manufacturer’s expected profit and consumer surplus are the same as those in the case when the
recall occurs before t = 1 − ε. We find that the overall structure of the equilibrium is similar to that in
the main body of the manuscript. Specifically, we verify that Propositions 1, 2, 3, and 4 continue to hold
(see Appendix D.2 for proofs). Figure 12(a) depicts the equilibrium outcomes when δ = 1 and ε = 0.2.18
We observe that the cover-up regions in the U.S. (Regions I and II) and in the U.K. (Regions I and III)
moved to the right of those in the base model (see Figure 6). This is because the demand drop following
a product recall decreases both the manufacturer’s expected profit and the consumer surplus. Therefore,
the manufacturers and regulators in both countries try to avoid product recalls; manufacturers attempt to
cover up potential defects with more significant harm and regulators become more reluctant to immediately
investigate a potential defect than in the base model. Yet, the underlying difference between the two countries’
policies on investigation announcement remains the same. Therefore, the findings are similar to those in the
main body of the manuscript.
In the second case, we assume a time-dependent impact; that is, if a recall occurs after t = 1 − ε, the
demand drops only until t = 1 and thus the demand drops for less than ε period. We numerically explore
this second case in Figure 12(b) with the same parameter values as in the first case, and observe that the
equilibrium outcomes remain very similar to those in the first case and in the main body of the manuscript.
18 With these parameter values, the amount of demand drop is the same as that during the regulator’s investigation
under the U.S. policy.
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Figure 13 Equilibrium Outcomes with Demand Drop After a Cover-Up Revelation
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Overall, we find that our main findings are robust to short-term demand drop after a product recall: In the
U.S. the regulator remains less likely to investigate and the manufacturer is more likely to cover up defects
with significant harm compared to the U.K.
C.4. Demand Drop After a Cover-Up Revelation
In our base model, we assume that consumer demand decreases only during the regulator’s investigation under
the U.S. policy. In this section, we consider the case where consumer demand also decreases temporarily after
a cover-up is revealed by the regulator’s voluntary investigation in both the U.S. and the U.K. This additional
demand drop could occur because consumers may be wary of purchasing a product from a manufacturer
that has recently covered up a defect. Similar to our approach in Appendix C.3, we assume that the demand
rate drops to 1−F (p+ δh), where δ > 0, for ε∈ (0,1) time period after a cover-up is revealed. As in the first
case of Appendix C.3, to simplify the analysis, we assume that even if a cover-up is revealed after t= 1− ε,
the reductions in the manufacturer’s expected profit and expected consumer surplus are the same as those
in the case when a cover-up is revealed before t= 1− ε.
We find that the overall structure of the equilibrium remains unaffected by considering demand drop
after a cover-up revelation. In particular, we verify that Propositions 1, 2, 3, and 4 continue to hold (see
Appendix D.3 for proofs). Figure 13 depicts the equilibrium outcomes when ε= 0.2 and δ = 4. Note that,
with these parameter values, the amount of demand drop after a cover-up revelation is four times greater
than the demand drop during the regulator’s investigation under the U.S. policy.19 Yet, we still find that
the overall structure of the equilibrium in Figure 13 remains similar to that in Figure 6 of the base model.
As expected, demand drop after a cover-up revelation discourages the manufacturers to cover up a potential
defect in both countries. Yet, the manufacturers still have an incentive to cover up a potential defect because
there is a chance that the regulator may not initiate a voluntary investigation at a later time when the
expected harm h is relatively low (Regions I and III) and that the defect may not actually exist when the
19 Recall that all our figures are depicted with parameter values we estimated from the Toyota recalls in 2009-2010,
in which the consumer demand drops to 1−F (p+h) during the regulator’s investigation in the U.S. for, on average,
l= 0.2 time period.
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Figure 14 Equilibrium Outcomes under Demand Substitution
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Expected harm (h)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
R
el
ia
bi
lit
y 
of
 s
ig
na
l (
)
III
I
II
Manufacturers	in	both	
countries	cover	up.
Only	manufacturer	
in	the	U.S.	covers	up.
Only	manufacturer	
in	the	U.K.	covers	up.
reliability of the signal ρ is moderate (Region II). Note that demand drop after a cover-up revelation does
not affect the regulator’s decision, because the regulator only decides whether to immediately investigate
a potential defect reported by the manufacturer when there is no cover-up. Overall, our main findings
are robust: In the U.S. the regulator remains less likely to conduct an immediate investigation and the
manufacturer more likely to cover up defects with significant harm compared to the U.K.
C.5. Demand Substitution
In our base model, during investigation of the U.S. regulator, consumers assume the defect exists, and thus
they purchase the product only if their valuation v is higher than the sum of the price and the expected harm
of the defect, p+h. Consequently, consumer surplus decreases from
∫ v̄
p
(v−p)f(v)dv to
∫ v̄
p+h
(v−p−h)f(v)dv
during the investigation period; see equations (6) and (7). However, consumers may be able to purchase a
similar product from a different manufacturer. In this scenario, their total surplus may not decrease as much
as in our base model (while the manufacturer still suffers from decreased demand). We check the robustness
of our results to this scenario, in which consumer surplus is unaffected by the investigation announcement.
Under the U.S. policy, different from the base model, demand substitution makes consumer surplus equal
to that under the U.K. policy, i.e., SUS = SUK . This is because the only difference between the two countries’
policies, i.e., investigation announcement, no longer affects consumer surplus.20 However, the manufacturer’s
expected profit in the U.S. remains unchanged from the base model by demand substitution because she
still suffers from decreased demand as in the base model. Under the U.K. policy, demand substitution
changes neither consumer surplus nor the manufacturer’s expected profit, because the U.K. regulator does
not announce the investigation anyway.
20 Note that, if a defect exists, then the consumers in the U.S. who purchase the substitute product during an
investigation period do not suffer from the harm, whereas all consumers in the U.K. suffer from the harm. However,
we still have that SUS = SUK because of the following reasons. First, if there is an investigation, any consumer
harm is accounted for in the manufacturers’ expected profit as compensation, and thus is not accounted for in the
consumer surplus. Second, if there is no investigation, then there is no investigation announcement either. Therefore,
SUS = SUK .
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We verify that Propositions 1, 2, and 3 continue to hold. We observe that Proposition 4 also holds but under
different conditions (see Appendix D.4 for proofs).21 Overall, we find that the structure of the equilibrium
is similar to that in the base model, as illustrated in Figure 14. The only difference from the equilibrium in
the base model is that the U.S. regulator is now less reluctant to immediately investigate a potential defect.
This is because, under demand substitution, the regulator’s investigation announcement reduces only the
manufacturer’s expected profit, whereas in the base model it reduces both the manufacturer’s expected profit
and consumer surplus. Therefore, with demand substitution, the regulator’s investigation announcement
does not decrease social welfare as much as in the base model, and thus the regulator is less reluctant
to immediately investigate. Nonetheless, comparing the U.S. and U.K. equilibria in Figure 14, we observe
that our main insights continue to hold: In the U.S. the regulator is less likely to carry out an immediate
investigation and the manufacturer is more likely to cover up defects with significant harm compared to the
U.K.
C.6. Alternative Objective Function of the Regulator
In our base model, the regulator’s objective is to maximize the social welfare W = π+S−Γ, where π is the
manufacturer’s profit, S is the consumer surplus, and Γ is the regulator’s cost. Note that social welfare does
account for consumer harm at its face value through either the manufacturer’s profit or a combination of the
manufacturer’s profit and the consumer surplus, depending on whether the manufacturer compensates the
consumer harm fully or only partially. In this section, we demonstrate the robustness of our main findings by
considering an alternative objective function of the regulator that places more emphasis on consumer harm.
Our approach to do this is inspired by the objective functions used in the sustainable OM literature such
as Atasu et al. (2009) and Kraft et al. (2013). Specifically, we consider the following alternative objective
function:
Ŵ = φ(π+S)− (1−φ)H −Γ, (21)
where H is the expected consumer harm and φ ∈ [0,1] is a parameter that allows us to adjust the weight
that the regulator assigns to consumer harm. For φ = 1, this alternative objective function coincides with
social welfare; i.e., Ŵ =W . For φ< 1, Ŵ assigns a higher weight to consumer harm than W . For φ= 0, Ŵ
considers only consumer harm and the regulator’s cost; i.e., Ŵ =−H −Γ.
We find that the overall structure of the equilibrium with this alternative objective is similar to that in
the main body of the manuscript. In particular, we verify that Propositions 1, 2, and 3 continue to hold
(see Appendix D.5 for proofs). Figures 15(a) and 15(b) depict the equilibrium outcomes for the cases with
φ= 0.5 and φ= 0.2, respectively. As φ decreases, the regulator’s willingness to investigate increases, because
immediate investigation can reduce consumer harm. However, conditional on the regulator’s investigation
decision, the manufacturer’s decision on cover-up remains unaffected. More importantly, these figures demon-
strate that our findings are robust to this alternative objective: In the U.S., the regulator remains less likely
21 The condition is p < r+h for Proposition 4(i) and p < Pr(D | D̃)(r+h) for Proposition 4(ii). Under the parameter
values we estimated for Toyota recalls in Online Appendix B, the U.K. social welfare is higher than the U.S. social
welfare as in the base model.
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Figure 15 Equilibrium Under the Alternative Objective Function of the Regulator
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(a) Equilibrium When φ= 0.5
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(b) Equilibrium When φ= 0.2
Figure 16 Values of the Alternative Objective Function of the Regulator
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(a) Regulator’s Objective When φ= 0.5 and ρ= 0.8
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(b) Regulator’s Objective When φ= 0 and ρ= 0.8
to investigate and the manufacturer is more likely to cover up defects with significant harm than in the
U.K. Finally, Figure 16 shows how the value of this alternative objective function changes with the expected
harm h. As in the main body of the paper, we find that the value of this alternative objective function is
generally higher under the U.K. policy, except for the extreme case when φ is close to zero, as can be seen
in Figure 16(b).
C.7. Alternative Distributions of Voluntary Investigation Timing
In the main body of the manuscript, we assume the regulator’s voluntary investigation timing, t̂, is uniformly
distributed on [0,1− l]. In this section, we relax this assumption to consider distributions that are either
linearly increasing or decreasing in t̂.
To understand our motivation to study these alternative distributions, consider two defects with the same
expected harm, h, but one of the defects has a larger probability of causing harm coupled with a smaller
impact of the harm. Then, one may expect that the regulator may receive a larger number of consumer
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Figure 17 Equilibrium Outcomes under Nonuniform Distributions of t̂
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(a) g(t̂ |D) is linearly decreasing in t̂
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(b) g(t̂ |D) is linearly increasing in t̂
complaints for the large-probability small-impact defect and this could advance the regulator’s investigation
timing. Thus, this type of defect could be modeled with a decreasing distribution of voluntary investiga-
tion timing. By contrast, the small-probability large-impact defect could be modeled with an increasing
distribution.
We consider the following linearly decreasing and increasing distributions:
g(t̂ |D) =− 2h
(1− l)h̄
(
t̂− (1− l)
(1− l)
)
and g(t̂ |D) = 2h
(1− l)2h̄
t̂.
We have selected the slopes of these linear distributions to ensure a fair comparison among all three distri-
butions by having the same probability that the regulator will initiate a voluntary investigation, which is∫ 1−l
0
g(t̂ |D)dt̂= h/h̄.
We find that the structure of the equilibrium is similar to that in the main body of the manuscript.
In particular, we verify that Propositions 1, 2, 3, and 4 continue to hold (see Appendix D.6 for proofs).
Figure 17 illustrates the equilibrium outcomes. The main effect of considering an increasing distribution
is that the regulator is more likely to investigate immediately and the manufacturer is less likely to cover
up potential defects. This is because with increasing distribution, voluntary investigations take place later,
increasing potential recall costs and consumer harm, both in the U.K. and U.S. More importantly, comparing
the equilibria for the U.S. and U.K, we observe that our main insight continues to hold: In the U.S. the
regulator is less likely to investigate immediately and the manufacturer is more likely to cover up defects
with significant harm for both alternative distributions.
C.8. Manufacturer’s Internal Investigation
In our base model, the following two decisions are sequentially made: 1) the manufacturer decides whether
to report a potential defect, and 2) if the manufacturer reports a potential defect, then the regulator decides
whether to investigate it immediately. We can consider a situation where the manufacturer makes the follow-
ing additional decision after the first two decisions are made: if the manufacturer covered up or the regulator
did not investigate a report immediately, then the manufacturer decides whether to conduct an internal
investigation. This results in a three-stage game.
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Figure 18 U.S. Equilibrium Outcomes When the Manufacturer Carries Out an Internal Investigation
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Unfortunately, it is not possible to characterize the equilibrium of this complex three-stage game under
the assumptions in the main body of the manuscript. Thus, we characterize the equilibrium numerically
under the following additional assumptions. First, the manufacturer’s internal investigation has the same
characteristics as the regulator’s investigation, including the duration l and cost C. Second, the regulator
does not initiate his voluntary investigation while the manufacturer’s own internal investigation is underway.
Third, if the manufacturer decides to cover up a potential defect, the expected penalty the manufacturer
pays to the regulator is the same regardless of whether the manufacturer conducts an internal investigation
or not. Finally, when the regulator decides whether to immediately investigate a potential defect in the
second stage of the game, he ignores the possibility that the manufacturer may run a secret investigation
internally. In fact, our interview with the U.K. regulator indicated no such consideration when deciding its
investigation.
Under this model, for the U.S., we find that the manufacturer tends to cover up more potential defects
with even more significant harm and instead conducts an internal investigation, as depicted in Figure 18.
Specifically, the equilibrium outcomes differ from those in the base model in the two regions on the right of
Figure 18. First, in the green region on the upper right side, the manufacturer covers up a potential defect
and conducts an internal investigation. Compared with the equilibrium outcomes in the base model (see
Figure 6), we observe that the manufacturer covers up even more defects, although she ends up conducting
an internal investigation. Second, in the yellow region in the lower right side, the manufacturer reports a
potential defect but the regulator does not investigate it immediately, and subsequently the manufacturer
conducts an internal investigation. By contrast, for the U.K., we find that the manufacturer has no incentive
to conduct an internal investigation. This is mainly because the manufacturer always prefers the regulator
conducting the investigation instead of the manufacturer herself, since i) the regulator would not announce
the investigation anyway and ii) the manufacturer does not need to incur the investigation cost C if the
regulator does the investigation. Therefore, the equilibrium outcomes for the U.K. remain the same as in the
base model depicted in Figure 5.
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From these results, we observe that the manufacturer’s internal investigation may set the two countries’
policies even farther apart and induce more cover-ups under the U.S. policy, although it induces more internal
investigations too.
Appendix D: Proofs of Results in Extensions
We provide the proofs of propositions for the extensions given in Appendix C. The proofs build on the proofs
of the corresponding propositions under the base model, which are given in Appendix A. Thus, to conserve
space, for each proposition, we refer to intermediate results provided in the proof of the corresponding
proposition given in Appendix A. We denote the expected values of the manufacturer’s profit, consumer
surplus, regulator’s cost, and social welfare in each extension by π̂, Ŝ, Γ̂, and Ŵ respectively, while denoting
those of the base model by π, S, Γ, and W .
D.1. Proofs for Appendix C.2: Consumers’ Risk Aversion
Only the analysis of the U.S. policy is affected by this extension.
D.1.1. When σ is independent of h Let d(p,h+ γσ) be the demand rate during investigation under
the U.S. policy. We have that Γ̂US(R,I) = Γ
US
(R,I) and Γ̂
US
(R,NI) = Γ
US
(R,NI). Moreover,
π̂US(R,I) = π
US
(R,I)− pl · (d(p,h)− d(p,h+ γσ)) +Pr(D | D̃)(r+h)l · (d(p,h)− d(p,h+ γσ)),
π̂US(R,NI) = π
US
(R,NI)−Pr(D | D̃)
[∫ 1−l
0
lp(d(p,h)− d(p,h+ γσ))g(t̂ |D)dt̂−
∫ 1−l
0
(r+h)l(d(p,h)− d(p,h+ γσ))g(t̂ |D)dt̂
]
,
π̂US(NR) = π̂
US
(R,NI)−Pr(D | D̃) · θ(K1h+K2)
∫ 1−l
0
g(t̂ |D)dt̂,
ŜUS(R,I) = S
US
(R,I)− l
[∫ v̄
p+h
(v− p−h)f(v)dv−
∫ v̄
p+h+γσ
(v− p−h− γσ)f(v)dv
]
,
ŜUS(R,NI) = S
US
(R,NI)−Pr(D | D̃)
∫ 1−l
0
g(t̂ |D)dt̂ · l
[∫ v̄
p+h
(v− p−h)f(v)dv−
∫ v̄
p+h+γσ
(v− p−h− γσ)f(v)dv
]
.
Proof of Proposition 1. We have that
ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUS(R,NI) = Pr(D | D̃)ξ1(h)−
lh
v̄
(
v̄− 1
2
h
)
− γσl
v̄
(
v̄−h− γσ
2
)
−C,
where
ξ1(h) = χ1(h) +
γσl
v̄
(
r+h+ (p− r−h)h
h̄
+ (2v̄− 2p− 2h− γσ) h
2h̄
)
,
using χ1(h) defined in (10). If ξ̂1(h) = ξ1(h)− lhv̄
(
v̄− 1
2
h
)
− γσl
v̄
(
v̄−h− γσ
2
)
−C < 0, then ŴUS(R,I)−ŴUS(R,NI) < 0
is always satisfied, because Pr(D | D̃)≤ 1. If ξ̂1(h)≥ 0, then ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUS(R,NI) ≥ 0 if and only if
ρ≥ ρUSI (h) = max
{
(lh/v̄)(v̄−h/2)+(γσl/v̄)(v̄−h−γσ/2)+C
ξ1(h)
−Pr(D)
1−Pr(D)
,0
}
.
We verify that ξ̂1(h) is a cubic function of h and the coefficient of the cubic term is negative. Also, ξ̂1(0) =
− rl
v̄
(v̄− p)− γσl
v̄
(v̄− r− γσ
2
)−C < 0, because v̄− r− σγ
2
≥ v̄− r− 1
2
(v̄− p− h) = 1
2
(v̄+ p+ h− 2r)> 0 since
γσ ≤ v̄− p− h and r < p < v̄. Moreover, ξ̂1(h̄) = (r+h̄)2v̄ (v̄− p)(1− l)> 0. Therefore, there exists h
US
I ∈ (0, h̄)
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such that ξ̂1(h)≥ 0 if and only if h≥ hUSI . Thus, ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUS(R,NI) ≥ 0 is satisfied if and only if h≥ hUSI and
ρ≥ ρUSI (h), where ρUSI (h)∈ [0,1]. 
Proof of Proposition 2. We show that there exist hUSR and ρ
US
R (h) such that, when the regulator always
investigates immediately, the manufacturer reports a potential defect if and only if h≥ hUSR and ρ≥ ρUSR (h).
The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2 under the base model.
Using Ω1(h) defined in (16), we have that
π̂US(R,I)− π̂US(NR) = Pr(D | D̃)ψ1(h)−
pl(h+ γσ)
v̄
, where ψ1(h) = Ω1(h) +
γσl
v̄
(
r+h+ (p− r−h)h
h̄
)
.
If ψ̂1(h) =ψ1(h)− pl(h+γσ)v̄ < 0, then π̂
US
(R,I)− π̂US(NR) < 0 is always satisfied, because Pr(D | D̃)≤ 1. If ψ̂1(h)≥ 0,
then π̂US(R,I)− π̂US(NR) ≥ 0 if and only if
ρ≥ ρUSR (h) = max
{
pl(h+γσ)/v̄
ψ1(h)
−Pr(D)
1−Pr(D)
,0
}
. (22)
We verify that ψ̂1(h) is a cubic function of h, the coefficient of the cubic term is negative, and ψ̂1(0) =
−lr
(
1− p
v̄
)
− γσl
v̄
(p− r) < 0 and ψ̂1(h̄) = Ω̂1(h̄) > 0 by (18). Therefore, there exists hUSR ∈ (0, h̄) such that
ψ̂1(h) ≥ 0 if and only if h ≥ hUSR . Thus, π̂US(R,I) − π̂US(NR) ≥ 0 if and only if h ≥ hUSR and ρ ≥ ρUSR (h), where
ρUSR (h)∈ [0,1]. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof is the same as in the base model. 
Proof of Proposition 4. We have that
ŴUS(NR)− ŴUK(NR) = ŴUS(R,NI)− ŴUK(R,NI) =−Pr(D | D̃)
hl(h+ γσ)
v̄h̄
[
v̄− r− 3h+ γσ
2
]
.
Therefore, ŴUS(NR)− ŴUK(NR) > 0 if and only if v̄ < r+
3h+γσ
2
. Also,
ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUK(R,I) =−
l(h+ γσ)
v̄
[
v̄− h+ γσ
2
−Pr(D | D̃)(r+h)
]
.
Therefore, ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUK(R,I) > 0 if and only if v̄ <
h+γσ
2
+Pr(D | D̃)(r+h). 
D.1.2. When σ is proportional to h Let d(p,βh) be the demand rate during investigation under the
U.S. policy. We have that Γ̂US(R,I) = Γ
US
(R,I) and Γ̂
US
(R,NI) = Γ
US
(R,NI). Moreover,
π̂US(R,I) = π
US
(R,I)− pl · (d(p,h)− d(p,βh)) +Pr(D | D̃)(r+h)l · (d(p,h)− d(p,βh)),
π̂US(R,NI) = π
US
(R,NI)−Pr(D | D̃)
[∫ 1−l
0
lp(d(p,h)− d(p,βh))g(t̂ |D)dt̂−
∫ 1−l
0
(r+h)l(d(p,h)− d(p,βh))g(t̂ |D)dt̂
]
,
π̂US(NR) = π̂
US
(R,NI)−Pr(D | D̃) · θ(K1h+K2)
∫ 1−l
0
g(t̂ |D)dt̂,
ŜUS(R,I) = S
US
(R,I)− l
[∫ v̄
p+h
(v− p−h)f(v)dv−
∫ v̄
p+βh
(v− p−βh)f(v)dv
]
,
ŜUS(R,NI) = S
US
(R,NI)−Pr(D | D̃)
∫ 1−l
0
g(t̂ |D)dt̂ · l
[∫ v̄
p+h
(v− p−h)f(v)dv−
∫ v̄
p+βh
(v− p−βh)f(v)dv
]
.
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Proof of Proposition 1. We have that
ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUS(R,NI) = Pr(D | D̃)ξ2(h)−
lβh
v̄
(
v̄− βh
2
)
−C,
where
ξ2(h) =
βlh2
v̄h̄
(
v̄− βh
2
)
+
(r+h)
2v̄h̄
(
(v̄− p)((1 + l)h− 2lh̄) + 2hβl(h̄−h)
)
+
(v̄− p)(h̄−h)h
v̄h̄
+
h
h̄
C.
If ξ̂2(h) = ξ2(h)− lβhv̄
(
v̄− βh
2
)
−C < 0, then ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUS(R,NI) < 0 is always satisfied, because Pr(D | D̃)≤ 1.
If ξ̂2(h)≥ 0, then ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUS(R,NI) ≥ 0 if and only if
ρ≥ ρUSI (h) = max
{
lβh(v̄−βh/2)/v̄+C
ξ2(h)
−Pr(D)
1−Pr(D)
,0
}
.
We verify that ξ̂2(h) is a cubic function of h, the coefficient of the cubic term is negative, and ξ̂2(0) =
− rl
v̄
(v̄ − p)− C < 0 and ξ̂2(h̄) = 12v̄ (1− l)(r + h̄)(v̄ − p) > 0. Therefore, there exists h
US
I ∈ (0, h̄) such that
ξ̂2(h)≥ 0 if and only if h≥ hUSI . Thus, ŴUS(R,I) − ŴUS(R,NI) ≥ 0 if and only if h≥ hUSI and ρ≥ ρUSI (h), where
ρUSI (h)∈ [0,1]. 
Proof of Proposition 2. We show that there exist hUSR and ρ
US
R (h) such that, when the regulator always
investigates immediately, the manufacturer reports a potential defect if and only if h≥ hUSR and ρ≥ ρUSR (h).
The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2 under the base model. We have that
π̂US(R,I)− π̂US(NR) = Pr(D | D̃)ψ2(h)−
plβh
v̄
,
where
ψ2(h) =−
β(lh3− (p− r)lh2− (r+h)lh̄h)
v̄h̄
+
(
1− p
v̄
) (1 + l− 2α)h2 + (r(1 + l) + 2αh̄− 2h̄l)h− 2h̄rl
2h̄
+ θ(K1h+K2)
h
h̄
.
If ψ̂2(h) = ψ2(h)− plβhv̄ < 0, then π̂
US
(R,I)− π̂US(NR) < 0 is always satisfied, because Pr(D | D̃)≤ 1. If ψ̂2(h)≥ 0,
then π̂US(R,I)− π̂US(NR) ≥ 0 if and only if
ρ≥ ρUSR (h) = max
{
plβh/v̄
ψ2(h)
−Pr(D)
1−Pr(D)
,0
}
.
We verify that ψ̂2(h) is a cubic function of h, the coefficient of the cubic term is negative, and ψ̂2(0) =
−rl
(
1− p
v̄
)
< 0 and ψ̂2(h̄) =
1
2v̄
[
(1− l)(v̄− p)r+ 2K2θv̄+ h̄((1− l)(v̄− p) + 2K1θv̄)
]
> 0. Therefore, there
exists hUSR ∈ (0, h̄) such that ψ̂2(h)≥ 0 if and only if h≥ hUSR . Thus, π̂US(R,I)− π̂US(NR) ≥ 0 if and only if h≥ hUSR
and ρ≥ ρUSR (h), where ρUSR (h)∈ [0,1]. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof is the same as in the base model. 
Proof of Proposition 4. We have that
ŴUS(NR)− ŴUK(NR) = ŴUS(R,NI)− ŴUK(R,NI) =−Pr(D | D̃) ·
βh2l(2v̄− 2r− (2 +β)h)
2v̄h̄
.
Therefore, ŴUS(NR)− ŴUK(NR) > 0 if and only if v̄ < r+ (1 +
β
2
)h. Also,
ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUK(R,I) =−
βhl
v̄
(
v̄− β
2
h−Pr(D | D̃)(r+h)
)
.
Therefore, ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUK(R,I) > 0 if and only if v̄ <
β
2
h+Pr(D | D̃)(r+h). 
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D.2. Proofs for Appendix C.3: Short-Term Demand Drop After a Product Recall
After a product recall, the demand rate drops to d(p, δh) = 1−F (p+ δh), where δ > 0, for ε > 0 time period.
For j = {US, UK}, we have that Γ̂j(R,I) = Γ
j
(R,I) and Γ̂
j
(R,NI) = Γ
j
(R,NI). Moreover,
π̂j(R,I) = π
j
(R,I)−Pr(D | D̃) · pε(d(p)− d(p, δh)),
π̂j(R,NI) = π
j
(R,NI)−Pr(D | D̃) ·
∫ 1−l
0
g(t̂ |D)dt̂ · pε(d(p)− d(p, δh)),
π̂j(NR) = π̂
j
(R,NI)−Pr(D | D̃) · θ(K1h+K2)
∫ 1−l
0
g(t̂ |D)dt̂,
Ŝj(R,I) = S
j
(R,I)−Pr(D | D̃) · ε
(∫ v̄
p
(v− p)f(v)dv−
∫ v̄
p+δh
(v− p− δh)f(v)dv
)
,
Ŝj(R,NI) = S
j
(R,NI)−Pr(D | D̃) ·
∫ 1−l
0
g(t̂ |D)dt̂ · ε
(∫ v̄
p
(v− p)f(v)dv−
∫ v̄
p+δh
(v− p− δh)f(v)dv
)
.
Proof of Proposition 1. We show this result for each country separately.
The U.S. Case. We have that
ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUS(R,NI) = Pr(D | D̃)ξ3(h)−
lh
v̄
(
v̄− 1
2
h
)
−C, where ξ3(h) = χ1(h)−
(
1− h
h̄
)(
v̄− 1
2
δh
)
εδh
v̄
,
using χ1(h) defined in (10). If ξ̂3(h) = ξ3(h) − lhv̄
(
v̄− 1
2
h
)
− C < 0, then ŴUS(R,I) − ŴUS(R,NI) < 0 is always
satisfied, because Pr(D | D̃)≤ 1. If ξ̂3(h)≥ 0, then ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUS(R,NI) ≥ 0 if and only if
ρ≥ ρUSI (h) = max
{
(lh/v̄)(v̄−h/2)+C
ξ3(h)
−Pr(D)
1−Pr(D)
,0
}
.
We verify that ξ̂3(h) is a cubic function of h, the coefficient of the cubic term is negative, and ξ̂3(0) = χ̂1(0)< 0
and ξ̂3(h̄) = χ̂1(h̄)> 0. Therefore, there exists h
US
I ∈ (0, h̄) such that ξ̂3(h)≥ 0 if and only if h≥ hUSI . Thus,
ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUS(R,NI) ≥ 0 is satisfied if and only if h≥ hUSI and ρ≥ ρUSI (h), where ρUSI (h)∈ [0,1].
The U.K. Case. We have that
ŴUK(R,I)− ŴUK(R,NI) = Pr(D | D̃)ξ4(h)−C, where ξ4(h) = χ2(h)−
(
1− h
h̄
)(
v̄− 1
2
δh
)
εδh
v̄
,
using χ2(h) defined in (13). If ξ̂4(h) = ξ4(h)−C < 0, then ŴUK(R,I) − ŴUK(R,NI) < 0 is always satisfied, because
Pr(D | D̃)≤ 1. If ξ̂4(h)≥ 0, then ŴUK(R,I)− ŴUK(R,NI) ≥ 0 if and only if
ρ≥ ρUKI (h) = max
{
C
ξ4(h)
−Pr(D)
1−Pr(D)
,0
}
.
We verify that ξ̂4(h) is a cubic function of h, the coefficient of the cubic term is negative, and ξ̂4(0) = χ̂2(0)< 0
and ξ̂4(h̄) = χ̂2(h̄)> 0. Therefore, there exists h
UK
I ∈ (0, h̄) such that ξ̂4(h)≥ 0 if and only if h≥ hUKI . Thus,
ŴUK(R,I)− ŴUK(R,NI) ≥ 0 is satisfied if and only if h≥ hUKI and ρ≥ ρUKI (h), where ρUKI (h)∈ [0,1]. 
Proof of Proposition 2. We show that there exist hUSR and ρ
US
R (h) such that, when the regulator always
investigates immediately, the manufacturer reports a potential defect if and only if h≥ hUSR and ρ≥ ρUSR (h).
The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2 under the base model.
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Using Ω1(h) defined in (16), we have that
π̂US(R,I)− π̂US(NR) = Pr(D | D̃)ψ3(h)−
plh
v̄
, where ψ3(h) = Ω1(h)−
pεδh
v̄
(
1− h
h̄
)
.
If ψ̂3(h) = ψ3(h)− plhv̄ < 0, then π̂
US
(R,I)− π̂US(NR) < 0 is always satisfied. If ψ̂3(h)≥ 0, then π̂US(R,I)− π̂US(NR) ≥ 0 if
and only if
ρ≥ ρUSR (h) = max
{
plh/v̄
ψ3(h)
−Pr(D)
1−Pr(D)
,0
}
.
We verify that ψ̂3(h) is a cubic function of h, the coefficient of the cubic term is negative, and ψ̂3(0) =
Ω̂1(0) < 0 and ψ̂3(h̄) = Ω̂1(h̄) > 0. Therefore, there exists h
US
R ∈ (0, h̄) such that ψ̂3(h) ≥ 0 if and only if
h≥ hUSR . Thus, π̂US(R,I)− π̂US(NR) ≥ 0 if and only if h≥ hUSR and ρ≥ ρUSR (h), where ρUSR (h)∈ [0,1]. 
Proof of Proposition 3. We show that there exists hUKR such that, when the regulator always investigates
immediately, the manufacturer reports a potential defect if and only if h ≥ hUKR . The rest of the proof is
similar to the proof of Proposition 3 under the base model.
Using Ω2(h) defined in (19), we have that
π̂UK(R,I)− π̂UK(NR) = Pr(D | D̃)ψ4(h), where ψ4(h) = Ω2(h)−
pεδh
v̄
(
1− h
h̄
)
.
We verify that ψ4(h) is a quadratic function of h, ψ4(0) = Ω2(0)< 0, and ψ4(h̄) = Ω2(h̄)> 0. Therefore, there
exists hUKR ∈ (0, h̄) such that π̂UK(R,I)− π̂UK(NR) ≥ 0 if and only if h≥ hUKR . 
Proof of Proposition 4. It is trivial that ŴUS(NR)−ŴUK(NR) =WUS(NR)−WUK(NR), ŴUS(R,NI)−ŴUK(R,NI) =WUS(R,NI)−
WUK(R,NI) and Ŵ
US
(R,I)− ŴUK(R,I) =WUS(R,I)−WUK(R,I). Therefore, the proof is the same as in the base model. 
D.3. Proofs for Appendix C.4: Demand Drop After a Cover-Up Relevation
This extension affects only the manufacturer’s expected profit and consumer surplus in the (NR) scenario
under both countries’ policies. Specifically, for j = {US, UK}, we have that
π̂j(NR) = π
j
(NR)−Pr(D | D̃)
∫ 1−l
0
g(t̂ |D)dt̂ · θpε(d(p)− d(p, δh)),
Ŝj(NR) = S
j
(NR)−Pr(D | D̃)
∫ 1−l
0
g(t̂ |D)dt̂ · θε
(∫ v̄
p
(v− p)f(v)dv−
∫ v̄
p+δh
(v− p− δh)f(v)dv
)
.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is the same as in the base model. 
Proof of Propositions 2. We show that there exist hUSR and ρ
US
R (h) such that, when the regulator always
investigates immediately, the manufacturer reports a potential defect if and only if h≥ hUSR and ρ≥ ρUSR (h).
The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2 under the base model. We have that
π̂US(R,I)− π̂US(NR) = Pr(D | D̃)ψ5(h)−
plh
v̄
, where ψ5(h) = Ω1(h) + θpε
δh2
v̄h̄
,
using Ω1(h) defined in (16). If ψ̂5(h) = ψ5(h)− plhv̄ < 0, then π̂
US
(R,I) − π̂US(NR) < 0 is always satisfied, because
Pr(D | D̃)≤ 1. If ψ̂5(h)≥ 0, then π̂US(R,I)− π̂US(NR) ≥ 0 if and only if
ρ≥ ρUSR (h) = max
{
plh/v̄
ψ5(h)
−Pr(D)
1−Pr(D)
,0
}
.
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We verify that ψ̂5(h) is a cubic function of h, the coefficient of the cubic term is negative, and ψ̂5(0) =
−lr(1− p
v̄
)< 0 and ψ̂5(h̄) =
1
2v̄
[(1− l)(v̄ − p)r+ 2K2θv̄ + h̄((1− l)(v̄ − p) + 2K1θv̄)] + θpε δh̄v̄ > 0. Therefore,
there exists hUSR ∈ (0, h̄) such that ψ̂5(h)≥ 0 if and only if h≥ hUSR . Thus, π̂US(R,I) − π̂US(NR) ≥ 0 if and only if
h≥ hUSR and ρ≥ ρUSR (h), where ρUSR (h)∈ [0,1]. 
Proof of Proposition 3. We show that there exists hUKR such that, when the regulator always investigates
immediately, the manufacturer reports a potential defect if and only if h ≥ hUKR . The rest of the proof is
similar to the proof of Proposition 3 under the base model. We have that
π̂UK(R,I)− π̂UK(NR) = Pr(D | D̃)ψ6(h), where ψ6(h) = Ω2(h) + θpε
δh2
v̄h̄
,
using Ω2(h) defined in (19). We verify that ψ6(h) is a quadratic function of h, and ψ6(0) =−rl(1− pv̄ )< 0
and ψ6(h̄) =
1
2v̄
[(1− l)(v̄−p)(r+ h̄) +2K2θv̄+ 2K1θv̄h̄]+θpε δh̄v̄ > 0. Therefore, there exists h
UK
R ∈ (0, h̄) such
that π̂UK(R,I)− π̂UK(NR) ≥ 0 if and only if h≥ hUKR . 
Proof of Proposition 4. Scenarios (R,I) and (R,NI) remain unaffected by this extension. Also, it is easy
to see that ŴUS(NR)− ŴUK(NR) =WUS(NR)−WUK(NR). Therefore, the proof is the same as in the base model. 
D.4. Proofs for Appendix C.5: Demand Substitution
It is easy to see that only the consumer surplus under the U.S. policy is affected by this extension. Specifically,
ŜUS(R,I) =
∫ v̄
p
(v− p)f(v)dv,
ŜUS(R,NI) = Pr(N | D̃)
∫ v̄
p
(v− p)f(v)dv
+Pr(D | D̃)
[∫ 1−l
0
g(t̂ |D)dt̂
∫ v̄
p
(v− p)f(v)dv+Pr(t̂= 1 |D)
(∫ v̄
p
(v− p)f(v)dv− (1−α)hd(p)
)]
.
Proof of Proposition 1. We need to show only the U.S. case.
The U.S. Case. We have that
ŴUS(R,I) =W
US
(R,I) +
lh
2v̄
(2v̄− 2p−h), and ŴUS(R,NI) =WUS(R,NI) +Pr(D | D̃)
lh2
2v̄h̄
(2v̄− 2p−h).
Therefore,
ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUS(R,NI) = Pr(D | D̃)ξ7(h)−
plh
v̄
−C, where ξ7(h) = χ1(h)−
lh2
2v̄h̄
(2v̄− 2p−h),
using χ1(h) defined in (10). If ξ̂7(h) = ξ7(h)− plhv̄ − C < 0, then Ŵ
US
(R,I) − ŴUS(R,NI) < 0 is always satisfied,
because Pr(D | D̃)≤ 1. If ξ̂7(h)≥ 0, then ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUS(R,NI) ≥ 0 if and only if
ρ≥ ρUSI (h) = max
{
plh/v̄+C
ξ7(h)
−Pr(D)
1−Pr(D)
,0
}
.
We verify that ξ̂7(h) is a cubic function of h, the coefficient of the cubic term is − lh
3
v̄h̄
< 0, and ξ̂7(0) =
− rl
v̄
(v̄ − p)− C < 0 and ξ̂7(h̄) = 12v̄ (r + h̄)(1− l)(v̄ − p) > 0. Therefore, there exists h
US
I ∈ (0, h̄) such that
ξ̂7(h)≥ 0 if and only if h≥ hUSI . Thus, ŴUS(R,I) − ŴUS(R,NI) ≥ 0 if and only if h≥ hUSI and ρ≥ ρUSI (h), where
ρUSI (h)∈ [0,1]. 
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Proofs of Propositions 2 and 3. The proofs are the same as in the base model. 
Proof of Proposition 4. We have that
ŴUS(NR)− ŴUK(NR) = ŴUS(R,NI)− ŴUK(R,NI) =−Pr(D | D̃)
lh2
v̄h̄
(p− r−h).
Therefore, ŴUS(NR)− ŴUK(NR) > 0 if and only if p < r+h. Also,
ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUK(R,I) =−
lh
v̄
(p−Pr(D | D̃)(r+h)).
Therefore, ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUK(R,I) > 0 if and only if p < Pr(D | D̃)(r+h). 
D.5. Proofs for Appendix C.6: Alternative Objective Function of the Regulator
The consumer harm H is defined as follows.
HUS(R,I) = Pr(D | D̃)hl · d(p,h),
HUS(R,NI) =H
US
(NR) = Pr(D | D̃)
[∫ 1−l
0
h(d(p)t̂+ d(p,h)l)g(t̂ |D)dt̂+hd(p)Pr(t̂= 1 |D)
]
,
HUK(R,I) = Pr(D | D̃)hl · d(p),
HUK(R,NI) =H
UK
(NR) = Pr(D | D̃)
[∫ 1−l
0
h(t̂+ l)d(p)g(t̂ |D)dt̂+hd(p)Pr(t̂= 1 |D)
]
.
Proof of Proposition 1. We show this result for each country separately.
The U.S. Case. We have that
ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUS(R,NI) = Pr(D | D̃)ξ8(h)−φ
lh
v̄
(
v̄− h
2
)
−C,
where
ξ8(h) =
h
h̄
C +φ
[
(r+h)
2v̄h̄
((v̄− p)(h(1 + l)− 2h̄l) + 2lh(h̄−h)) + lh
2
v̄h̄
(
v̄− h
2
)
+
h(h̄−h)(v̄− p)
v̄h̄
]
− (1−φ)
[
hl(v̄− p−h)
v̄
− h
2((1 + l)(v̄− p)− 2hl)
2v̄h̄
− h(v̄− p)(h̄−h)
v̄h̄
]
.
If ξ̂8(h) = ξ8(h)−φ lhv̄
(
v̄− h
2
)
−C < 0, then ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUS(R,NI) < 0 is always satisfied, because Pr(D | D̃)≤ 1.
If ξ̂8(h)≥ 0, then ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUS(R,NI) ≥ 0 if and only if
ρ≥ ρUSI (h) = max
{
φlh(v̄−h/2)/v̄+C
ξ8(h)
−Pr(D)
1−Pr(D)
,0
}
.
We verify that ξ̂8(h) is a cubic function of h, the coefficient of the cubic term is negative, and ξ̂8(0) =
−φrl(v̄−p)
v̄
−C < 0 and ξ̂8(h̄) = φ (r+h̄)(v̄−p)(1−l)2v̄ + (1− φ)
(1−l)(v̄−p)h̄
2v̄
> 0. Therefore, there exists hUSI ∈ (0, h̄)
such that ξ̂8(h)≥ 0 if and only if h≥ hUSI . Thus, ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUS(R,NI) ≥ 0 is satisfied if and only if h≥ hUSI and
ρ≥ ρUSI (h), where ρUSI (h)∈ [0,1].
The U.K. Case. We have that
ŴUK(R,I)− ŴUK(R,NI) = Pr(D | D̃)ξ9(h)−C,
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where
ξ9(h) =
h
h̄
C +φ
[
h
(
1− h
h̄
)(
1− p
v̄
)
+ (r+h)
(
1− p
v̄
) h(1 + l)− 2h̄l
2h̄
]
− (1−φ)
[
hl
(
1− p
v̄
)
− (1 + l)(v̄− p)h
2
2v̄h̄
− h(v̄− p)(h̄−h)
v̄h̄
]
.
If ξ̂9(h) = ξ9(h)−C < 0, then ŴUK(R,I) − ŴUK(R,NI) < 0 is always satisfied, because Pr(D | D̃)≤ 1. If ξ̂9(h)≥ 0,
then ŴUK(R,I)− ŴUK(R,NI) ≥ 0 if and only if
ρ≥ ρUKI (h) = max
{
C
ξ9(h)
−Pr(D)
1−Pr(D)
,0
}
.
We verify that ξ̂9(h) is a quadratic function of h, and ξ̂9(0) =−φrl
(
1− p
v̄
)
−C < 0 and ξ̂9(h̄) = φ(r+ h̄)(1−
p
v̄
) 1−l
2
+ (1−φ) 1−l
2
v̄−p
v̄
h̄ > 0. Therefore, there exists hUKI ∈ (0, h̄) such that ξ̂9(h)≥ 0 if and only if h≥ hUKI .
Thus, ŴUK(R,I)− ŴUK(R,NI) ≥ 0 is satisfied if and only if h≥ hUKI and ρ≥ ρUKI (h), where ρUKI (h)∈ [0,1]. 
Proofs of Propositions 2 and 3. The proofs are the same as in the base model. 
D.6. Proofs for Appendix C.7: Alternative Distributions of Voluntary Investigation Timing
It is straightforward to see that, for each country, only the manufacturer’s profits in the (R,NI) and (NR)
scenarios change from the base model, while the manufacturer’s profit in the (R,I) scenario as well as the
consumer surplus and regulator’s cost in all scenarios remain unaffected, because
∫ 1−l
0
g(t̂ | D)dt̂ remains
unaffected (see equations in Section 3).
D.6.1. g(t̂ |D) is linearly decreasing in t̂
Proof of Proposition 1. We show this result for each country separately.
The U.S. Case. We have that ŴUS(R,I) =W
US
(R,I) and Ŵ
US
(R,NI) =W
US
(R,NI) +Pr(D | D̃)
(1−l)(r+h)(v̄−p)h
6v̄h̄
. Thus,
ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUS(R,NI) = Pr(D | D̃)ξ10(h)−
lh
v̄
(
v̄− h
2
)
−C, where ξ10(h) = χ1(h)−
(1− l)(r+h)(v̄− p)h
6v̄h̄
,
using χ1(h) defined in (10). If ξ̂10(h) = ξ10(h) − lhv̄
(
v̄− h
2
)
− C < 0, then ŴUS(R,I) − ŴUS(R,NI) < 0 is always
satisfied, because Pr(D | D̃)≤ 1. If ξ̂10(h)≥ 0, then ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUS(R,NI) ≥ 0 if and only if
ρ≥ ρUSI (h) = max
{
lh(v̄−h/2)/v̄+C
ξ10(h)
−Pr(D)
1−Pr(D)
,0
}
.
We verify that ξ̂10(h) is a cubic function of h, the coefficient of the cubic term is negative, and ξ̂10(0) =
− rl
v̄
(v̄− p)−C < 0 and ξ̂10(h̄) = (r+h̄)(v̄−p)(1−l)3v̄ > 0. Therefore, there exists h
US
I ∈ (0, h̄) such that ξ̂10(h)≥ 0
if and only if h≥ hUSI . Thus, ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUS(R,NI) ≥ 0 is satisfied if and only if h≥ hUSI and ρ≥ ρUSI (h), where
ρUSI (h)∈ [0,1].
The U.K. Case. We have that ŴUK(R,I) =W
UK
(R,I) and Ŵ
UK
(R,NI) =W
UK
(R,NI) +Pr(D | D̃)
(1−l)(v̄−p)(r+h)h
6v̄h̄
. Thus,
ŴUK(R,I)− ŴUK(R,NI) = Pr(D | D̃)ξ11(h)−C, where ξ11(h) = χ2(h)−
(1− l)(v̄− p)(r+h)h
6v̄h̄
,
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using χ2(h) defined in (13). If ξ̂11(h) = ξ11(h)−C < 0, then ŴUK(R,I)− ŴUK(R,NI) < 0 is always satisfied, because
Pr(D | D̃)≤ 1. If ξ̂11(h)≥ 0, then ŴUK(R,I)− ŴUK(R,NI) ≥ 0 if and only if
ρ≥ ρUKI (h) = max
{
C
ξ11(h)
−Pr(D)
1−Pr(D)
,0
}
.
We verify that ξ̂11(h) is a quadratic function of h, and ξ̂11(0) = −rl(1 − pv̄ ) − C < 0 and ξ̂11(h̄) =
(1−l)(v̄−p)(r+h̄)
3v̄
> 0. Therefore, there exists hUKI ∈ (0, h̄) such that ξ̂11(h) ≥ 0 if and only if h ≥ hUKI . Thus,
ŴUK(R,I)− ŴUK(R,NI) ≥ 0 is satisfied if and only if h≥ hUKI and ρ≥ ρUKI (h), where ρUKI (h)∈ [0,1]. 
Proof of Proposition 2. We show that there exist hUSR and ρ
US
R (h) such that, when the regulator always
investigates immediately, the manufacturer reports a potential defect if and only if h≥ hUSR and ρ≥ ρUSR (h).
The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2 under the base model.
We have that π̂US(R,I) = π
US
(R,I) and π̂
US
(NR) = π
US
(NR) +Pr(D | D̃)
(1−l)(r+h)(v̄−p)h
6v̄h̄
. Thus,
π̂US(R,I)− π̂US(NR) = Pr(D | D̃)ψ10(h)−
plh
v̄
, where ψ10(h) = Ω1(h)−
(1− l)(r+h)(v̄− p)h
6v̄h̄
,
using Ω1(h) defined in (16). If ψ̂10(h) =ψ10(h)− plhv̄ < 0, then π̂
US
(R,I)− π̂US(NR) < 0 is always satisfied, because
Pr(D | D̃)≤ 1. If ψ̂10(h)≥ 0, then π̂US(R,I)− π̂US(NR) ≥ 0 if and only if
ρ≥ ρUSR (h) = max
{
plh/v̄
ψ10(h)
−Pr(D)
1−Pr(D)
,0
}
.
We verify that ψ̂10(h) is a cubic function of h, the coefficient of the cubic term is negative, and ψ̂10(0) =
−lr(1− p
v̄
)< 0 and ψ̂10(h̄) =
(1−l)(r+h̄)(v̄−p)
3v̄
+ θ(K1h̄+K2)> 0. Therefore, there exists h
US
R ∈ (0, h̄) such that
ψ̂10(h) ≥ 0 if and only if h ≥ hUSR . Thus, π̂US(R,I) − π̂US(NR) ≥ 0 if and only if h ≥ hUSR and ρ ≥ ρUSR (h), where
ρUSR (h)∈ [0,1]. 
Proof of Proposition 3. We show that there exists hUKR such that, when the regulator always investigates
immediately, the manufacturer reports a potential defect if and only if h ≥ hUKR . The rest of the proof is
similar to the proof of Proposition 3 under the base model.
We have that π̂UK(R,I) = π
UK
(R,I) and π̂
UK
(NR) = π
UK
(NR) +Pr(D | D̃)
(1−l)(v̄−p)(r+h)h
6v̄h̄
. Thus,
π̂UK(R,I)− π̂UK(NR) = Pr(D | D̃)ψ11(h), where ψ11(h) = Ω2(h)−
(1− l)(v̄− p)(r+h)h
6v̄h̄
,
using Ω2(h) defined in (19). We verify that ψ11(h) is a quadratic function of h, and ψ11(0) =−rl(1− pv̄ )< 0 and
ψ11(h̄) =
(1−l)(v̄−p)(r+h̄)
3v̄
+ θ(K1h̄+K2)> 0. Therefore, there exists h
UK
R ∈ (0, h̄) such that π̂UK(R,I)− π̂UK(NR) ≥ 0
if and only if h≥ hUKR . 
Proof of Proposition 4. We have that ŴUS(NR)− ŴUK(NR) =WUS(NR)−WUK(NR), ŴUS(R,NI)− ŴUK(R,NI) =WUS(R,NI)−
WUK(R,NI) and Ŵ
US
(R,I)− ŴUK(R,I) =WUS(R,I)−WUK(R,I). Therefore, the proof is the same as in the base model. 
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D.6.2. g(t̂ |D) is linearly increasing in t̂
Proof of Proposition 1. We show this result for each country separately.
The U.S. Case. We have that ŴUS(R,I) =W
US
(R,I) and Ŵ
US
(R,NI) =W
US
(R,NI)−Pr(D | D̃)
(1−l)(r+h)h
6v̄h̄
(v̄− p). Thus,
ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUS(R,NI) = Pr(D | D̃)ξ12(h)−
lh
v̄
(
v̄− h
2
)
−C, where ξ12(h) = χ1(h) +
(1− l)(r+h)(v̄− p)h
6v̄h̄
,
using χ1(h) defined in (10). If ξ̂12(h) = ξ12(h) − lhv̄
(
v̄− h
2
)
− C < 0, then ŴUS(R,I) − ŴUS(R,NI) < 0 is always
satisfied, because Pr(D | D̃)≤ 1. If ξ̂12(h)≥ 0, then ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUS(R,NI) ≥ 0 if and only if
ρ≥ ρUSI (h) = max
{
lh(v̄−h/2)/v̄+C
ξ12(h)
−Pr(D)
1−Pr(D)
,0
}
.
We verify that ξ̂12(h) is a cubic function of h, the coefficient of the cubic term is negative, and ξ̂12(0) =
− rl
v̄
(v̄− p)−C < 0 and ξ̂12(h̄) = 2(1−l)(r+h̄)(v̄−p)3v̄ > 0. Therefore, there exists h
US
I ∈ (0, h̄) such that ξ̂12(h)≥ 0
if and only if h≥ hUSI . Thus, ŴUS(R,I)− ŴUS(R,NI) ≥ 0 is satisfied if and only if h≥ hUSI and ρ≥ ρUSI (h), where
ρUSI (h)∈ [0,1].
The U.K. Case. We have that ŴUK(R,I) =W
UK
(R,I) and Ŵ
UK
(R,NI) =W
UK
(R,NI)−Pr(D | D̃)
(1−l)(v̄−p)(r+h)h
6v̄h̄
. Thus,
ŴUK(R,I)− ŴUK(R,NI) = Pr(D | D̃)ξ13(h)−C, where ξ13(h) = χ2(h) +
(1− l)(v̄− p)(r+h)h
6v̄h̄
,
using χ2(h) defined in (13). If ξ̂13(h) = ξ13(h)−C < 0, then ŴUK(R,I)− ŴUK(R,NI) < 0 is always satisfied, because
Pr(D | D̃)≤ 1. If ξ̂13(h)≥ 0, then ŴUK(R,I)− ŴUK(R,NI) ≥ 0 if and only if
ρ≥ ρUKI (h) = max
{
C
ξ13(h)
−Pr(D)
1−Pr(D)
,0
}
.
We verify that ξ̂13(h) is a quadratic function of h, and ξ̂13(0) = −rl(1 − pv̄ ) − C < 0 and ξ̂13(h̄) =
2(1−l)(v̄−p)(r+h̄)
3v̄
> 0. Therefore, there exists hUKI ∈ (0, h̄) such that ξ̂13(h)≥ 0 if and only if h≥ hUKI . Thus,
ŴUK(R,I)− ŴUK(R,NI) ≥ 0 is satisfied if and only if h≥ hUKI and ρ≥ ρUKI (h), where ρUKI (h)∈ [0,1]. 
Proof of Proposition 2. We show that there exist hUSR and ρ
US
R (h) such that, when the regulator always
investigates immediately, the manufacturer reports a potential defect if and only if h≥ hUSR and ρ≥ ρUSR (h).
The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2 under the base model.
We have that π̂US(R,I) = π
US
(R,I) and π̂
US
(NR) = π
US
(NR)−Pr(D | D̃)
(1−l)(r+h)h
6v̄h̄
(v̄− p). Thus,
π̂US(R,I)− π̂US(NR) = Pr(D | D̃)ψ12(h)−
plh
v̄
, where ψ12(h) = Ω1(h) +
(1− l)(r+h)(v̄− p)h
6v̄h̄
,
using Ω1(h) defined in (16). If ψ̂12(h) =ψ12(h)− plhv̄ < 0, then π̂
US
(R,I)− π̂US(NR) < 0 is always satisfied, because
Pr(D | D̃)≤ 1. If ψ̂12(h)≥ 0, then π̂US(R,I)− π̂US(NR) ≥ 0 if and only if
ρ≥ ρUSR (h) = max
{
plh/v̄
ψ12(h)
−Pr(D)
1−Pr(D)
,0
}
.
We verify that ψ̂12(h) is a cubic function of h, the coefficient of the cubic term is negative, and ψ̂12(0) =
−lr(1− p
v̄
)< 0 and ψ̂12(h̄) = Ω̂1(h̄) +
(1−l)(r+h̄)(v̄−p)
6v̄
> 0, where Ω̂1(h̄)> 0 is defined in (18). Therefore, there
exists hUSR ∈ (0, h̄) such that ψ̂12(h)≥ 0 if and only if h≥ hUSR . Thus, π̂US(R,I)− π̂US(NR) ≥ 0 if and only if h≥ hUSR
and ρ≥ ρUSR (h), where ρUSR (h)∈ [0,1]. 
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Proof of Proposition 3. We show that there exists hUKR such that, when the regulator always investigates
immediately, the manufacturer reports a potential defect if and only if h ≥ hUKR . The rest of the proof is
similar to the proof of Proposition 3 under the base model.
We have that π̂UK(R,I) = π
UK
(R,I) and π̂
UK
(NR) = π
UK
(NR)−Pr(D | D̃)
(1−l)(v̄−p)(r+h)h
6v̄h̄
. Thus,
π̂UK(R,I)− π̂UK(NR) = Pr(D | D̃)ψ13(h), where ψ13(h) = Ω2(h) +
(1− l)(v̄− p)(r+h)h
6v̄h̄
,
using Ω2(h) defined in (19). We verify that ψ13(h) is a quadratic function of h, and ψ13(0) =−rl(1− pv̄ )< 0
and ψ13(h̄) = Ω2(h̄) +
(1−l)(v̄−p)(r+h̄)
6v̄
> 0, where Ω2(h̄)> 0 is defined in (20). Therefore, there exists h
UK
R ∈
(0, h̄) such that π̂UK(R,I)− π̂UK(NR) ≥ 0 if and only if h≥ hUKR . 
Proof of Proposition 4. We have that ŴUS(NR)− ŴUK(NR) =WUS(NR)−WUK(NR), ŴUS(R,NI)− ŴUK(R,NI) =WUS(R,NI)−
WUK(R,NI) and Ŵ
US
(R,I)− ŴUK(R,I) =WUS(R,I)−WUK(R,I). Therefore, the proof is the same as in the base model. 
